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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
ON PREVIOUS SYMPOSIA
SENTENCED FOR A “CRIME” THE
GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROVE: JONES
V. UNITED STATES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
FACTFINDING BY SENTENCING
FACTORS RATHER THAN ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE
BENJAMIN J. PRIESTER*
[W]e [have] rejected the claim that whenever a State links the severity of punishment to
the presence or absence of an identified fact the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.1
[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.2

I
INTRODUCTION
The tension between the two principles set out above is an unresolved dilemma for the United States Supreme Court. On the one hand, not every fact
relevant to sentencing a criminal defendant warrants the Constitution’s full
criminal procedure protections. On the other hand, if those protections apply
only to the facts selected by the legislature to determine guilt or innocence, the
sentencing proceeding may overwhelm the trial in importance because the sentencing facts will determine the defendant’s fate to a far greater extent. Justice
Scalia described this tension bluntly:
Suppose that a State repealed all of the violent crimes in its criminal code and replaced them with only one offense, “knowingly causing injury to another,” bearing a
penalty of 30 days in prison, but subject to a series of “sentencing enhancements”
authorizing additional punishment up to life imprisonment or death on the basis of
various levels of mens rea, severity of injury, and other surrounding circumstances.
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1. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis added).
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Could the state then grant the defendant a jury trial, with requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, solely on the question whether he “knowingly caused injury
to another,” but leave it for the judge to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant acted intentionally or accidentally, whether he had used
a deadly weapon, and whether the victim ultimately died from the injury the defendant inflicted?3

How does the Constitution resolve this tension? The decisions of the Court
have yet to provide an answer. The cases have, however, set out the basic
framework for analyzing the constitutional question. The Court has called certain facts the “elements” of a criminal offense. Elements require all of the
Constitution’s procedural protections, particularly the government’s beyond a
4
reasonable doubt burden of proof and trial by jury. The Court considers other
facts to be “sentencing factors.” Sentencing factors are factual determinations
that do not affect the defendant’s guilt or innocence, but only the severity of
the sentence imposed. The presence of a sentencing factor could increase or
decrease the sentence, or affect it in another way, such as by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence. The Constitution’s strict procedures for elements of
the offense do not apply, by definition, to sentencing factors, which may be determined, for example, by a preponderance of the evidence or by the judge
alone.
We would expect the Court normally to defer to the legislature on whether
a given factual determination is an element of the offense or a sentencing factor
for the offense. The question that the tension illustrated by Justice Scalia’s hypothetical raises, however, is whether the Constitution ever places a limit on the
legislature’s power to define a factual determination as an element or as a sentencing factor. Can a fact have such importance that it constitutionally must be
considered “necessary” to the crime, rather than merely relating to the
“severity” of the punishment? The Court’s dilemma is that the constitutional
answer is unclear, and the possibility of abuse by the legislature is real. In
5
Jones v. United States, a case argued in the 1998 Term, the Court had the opportunity to confront and resolve the elements/sentencing factors constitutional
question.
With this recent constitutional issue, this note supplements a long history of
articles on criminal law, procedure, and sentencing in Law and Contemporary

3. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. McMillan, 477 U.S.
at 100-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the risk that bank robbery or assault could be redefined
into affirmative defenses); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 223 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority’s holding will allow legislatures to redefine elements into affirmative defenses);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699 & n.24 (1975) (discussing the risk that the defendant could be
required to disprove aggravating facts in murder or assault).
4. For purposes of this note, I will assume that all crimes discussed are nonpetty offenses, for
which the right to jury trial is guaranteed by the Constitution in both state and federal criminal trials.
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (providing the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial for
crimes for which a sentence of more than six months in prison is possible); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating under the 14th Amendment full federal constitutional jury trial rights as
requirements for state criminal trials).
5. 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999).
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6

Problems. The note argues that the Constitution does restrict the power of the
legislature by requiring that certain facts be proved as elements of the offense.
Part II reviews the historical evolution of the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question. Part III describes seven proposed tests the Court might
adopt as solutions to the constitutional dilemma. Part IV turns to the text of
the Constitution itself, particularly the provisions relating to trials for “crimes.”
Part V evaluates the proposed constitutional tests to determine which provides
the best definition of a “crime” in the text as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Part VI describes the Court’s missed opportunity in Jones to adopt
the test proposed by Justice Scalia, which defines a “crime” for this constitutional purpose as the factual findings used to determine the defendant’s maximum possible sentence. The note concludes that this test is the rule the Court
should adopt for resolving the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question.
II
BACKGROUND: THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION EMERGES
The constitutional tension posed by the elements/sentencing factors issue
has emerged gradually over the last thirty years. A combination of Supreme
Court elaboration of constitutional criminal procedure doctrines and legislative
developments in sentencing law and procedure generated challenges of unconstitutionality based on grounds that previously had been unused or unavailable.
The Court now faces the constitutional question, with little doctrine and few
cases directly reaching the issue. Reviewing the evolution of the constitutional
question, therefore, is crucial for understanding where the Court now stands
and what constitutional rule it should adopt for future cases.
For most of our history, the federal criminal code allowed judges great leeway in sentencing convicted defendants. “Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should
7
be within the customarily wide range.” In particular, there were no limitations
on what facts the judge could consider at sentencing, nor was any standard of
evidence required: “Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and
8
found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all.” A judge could impose the greatest sentence available because of mere suspicion about the de-

6. See Symposium, Sentencing, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399 (Summer 1958); see also, e.g.,
Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(Winter 1995); Symposium, Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn
1984); Symposium, Police Practices, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 445 (Autumn 1971); Symposium,
Sex Offenses, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (Spring 1960); Symposium, Crime and Correction, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 583 (Autumn 1958); Symposium, Extending Federal Powers over Crime, 1
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399 (Autumn 1934).
7. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989).
8. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
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9

fendant, or could impose the maximum in every case no matter how sympa10
thetic the defendant might be. “Serious disparities in sentences . . . were
11
common.”
In addition, the Court historically never applied the full constitutional
criminal procedure protections to all findings of fact related to a defendant or
12
his crime. In Leland v. Oregon, for example, the Court held that because
Oregon had fully proven its case to the jury (including the mens rea the statute
required), the state could shift the onus to the defendant to prove the insanity
defense; “there was no constitutional requirement that the State shoulder the
13
burden of proving the sanity of the defendant.” At least to some extent, the
Court concluded, the Constitution does not command that every fact relevant
to the crime or the sentence always must be proved as an element of the offense.
14
In 1970, however, the Court took a dramatic step: In re Winship constitutionalized the government’s burden of proof in criminal trials. New York law
provided that juvenile delinquency proceedings required only the preponder15
ance of the evidence standard to convict the accused. The Court held that
such proceedings were criminal in nature, however, even though they involved
16
juveniles. Therefore, the Constitution required that the government’s burden
of proof for each element of the offense must be “beyond a reasonable
17
doubt.” Even though this strict standard appears nowhere in the Constitution,
the Winship Court held that “the traditional importance of that standard at
least from our early years as a Nation justifie[s] our conclusion” that due proc18
ess requires the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at every criminal trial.
The Winship burden of proof holding for criminal trials solidified a great
disparity between the procedures used in guilt-finding and those used in sentencing. The Court declared that when the government proves the elements of
9. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No.
97-6203), available at 1998 WL 713483. Justice Stevens argued:
You see, my point is that when you use these indeterminate sentencing examples where the
judge had total discretion, the judge then could act on ex parte submissions that were purely
suspicion, and you’re saying that because that was permissible in indeterminate sentencing,
when you have a regular system with statutorily required increases, you can still follow the
same basic principle. . . . It seems to me it doesn’t follow at all.
Id.
10. See id. at 13 (Justice Scalia: “Have you ever heard of a hanging judge? . . . Which was a judge
which would give the maximum. If you came up before him, you would get the max, period, and that
happened sometimes, didn’t it?”).
11. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365.
12. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
13. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (distinguishing Leland).
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15. See id. at 359.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 364.
18. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2254 n.6 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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the offense to the jury at the criminal trial, the Constitution requires a very
high level of proof. This rule stood in stark contrast to the historical deference
of the Court on sentencing issues; the Court’s precedents permitted sentencing
schemes such as Leland-style burden-shifting or the unregulated discretion of
federal judges to sentence defendants on whatever factors and proof satisfied
19
them.
Given this situation, the constitutional tension quickly emerged: whether
the Constitution required certain—or any—facts to be elements of the offense
(with full trial procedural protections including proof beyond a reasonable
doubt) rather than sentencing factors (with less procedural protection at trial or
in the separate sentencing proceeding). It did not take long for convicted defendants to assert on appeal that their convictions were unconstitutional be20
cause a fact “necessary to constitute the crime” had been proven as a sentencing factor, and not as an element of the offense under Winship.
The Court first confronted such a constitutional challenge in Mullaney v.
21
Wilbur. The Maine homicide statute provided that a murder conviction required proof that the killing was both unlawful (that is, not justified or excused)
and intentional (that is, either the defendant intended to kill, or he intended to
do an act reasonably likely to cause great bodily harm and that death in fact re22
sulted). If these two elements were proved, a murder conviction would be entered because the third element, the mens rea of malice aforethought, would be
23
presumed as a matter of law. The defendant could have his conviction reduced to manslaughter, however, if he proved by a preponderance of the evi24
dence that he acted in the heat of passion. Thus, the Maine state courts’s construction of the statute, by which the Court acknowledged it was bound, created

19. In 1984, Congress enacted the implementing legislation for the federal Sentencing Guidelines
to regulate and harmonize federal sentencing. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-68
(1989) (discussing the history of federal sentencing and the reasons for the adoption of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984). The Guidelines specify which factual determinations can be made in sentencing
defendants for each federal offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998). While most
lower courts have found that these determinations should be made by at least a preponderance of the
evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1992), the Supreme Court has addressed neither whether the preponderance of the evidence sentencing standard is constitutionally
necessary, nor whether it is always constitutionally sufficient. See supra note 9; Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1233 (1998) (“[W]e express no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sentencing determinations which bear significantly on the severity of the
sentence.”); cf. also United States v. Jackson, 161 F.3d 24, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that sentencing determinations under the Guidelines are generally made by a preponderance of the evidence,
but noting that a higher standard has been required by Courts of Appeals if the determination will
“significantly enhance” the sentence); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (“The
[Federal Sentencing] Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.”).
20. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
21. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
22. See id. at 685-86.
23. See id. at 686, 691-92.
24. See id. at 686.
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a single offense with two available sentencing gradations; the defendant bore
the burden of reducing the higher grade to the lower.
A unanimous Court held that the Maine statute was inconsistent with Winship. The Court discussed the common law history of murder and manslaughter, which included allowing malice aforethought to be a policy presumption
26
and not an element of the crime. On the other hand, Maine conceded that
27
malice aforethought and heat of passion were “inconsistent things,” were the
28
only distinction between murder and manslaughter, and led to greatly dispa29
rate sentences. The Court rejected Maine’s argument that “the fact in question here does not come into play until the jury already has determined that the
30
defendant is guilty”; that is, that the defendant’s state of mind was only a sentencing factor. Instead, the Court reasoned, malice aforethought is a statutory
element of the crime of murder that distinguished that crime from manslaughter, yet, under the Maine statute, its existence would be presumed by law unless
the defendant could prove otherwise. “By drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
31
fact upon which it turns,” Maine violated Winship. The state may not relieve
the prosecution of the burden of proving every statutory element of the offense;
if the legislature has made mens rea an element of the crime, the Constitution
32
requires that it be proved, not presumed.
Two years later, the burden-shifting statute challenged in Patterson v. New
33
York involved not a presumption, but rather an affirmative defense. New
York defined murder as intentionally (that is, not accidentally) causing the
34
death of another. Even if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the killing was intentional, however, the defendant was allowed an affirmative defense—to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing was
35
motivated by an extreme emotional disturbance, not by an intent to kill. The
New York courts held that this rule was consistent with Mullaney because the
prosecution bore the full burden of proving all statutory elements of the crime;
the mitigating fact of extreme emotional disturbance was not an element, and
36
thus the state could place the burden of proving it on the defendant.

25. See id. at 691-92.
26. See id. at 692-96.
27. Id. at 687.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 700.
30. Id. at 697. The concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, emphasized that the holding of Mullaney did not disturb the holding of Leland. See 421 U.S. at 705-06.
31. Id. at 698.
32. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) (interpreting Mullaney as limited to this
holding).
33. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
34. See id. at 199 & n.4.
35. See id. at 200.
36. See id. at 201.
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In a 5-3 decision, the Court agreed that mitigating factors available after
guilt has been proven fully need not be elements of the offense: “The Due
Process clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of abandoning
those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of
38
a crime . . . .” According to the Court, once the state has proven the elements
of the crime required by statute, any additional facts that the state may wish to
recognize as mitigating factors may be proved in whatever manner the state desires, including putting the burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative de39
fense. In other words, Patterson is like Leland, not like Winship or Mullaney:
Affirmative defenses and other mitigating factual determinations need not be
40
elements of the offense. The dissenters sharply disagreed, insisting that Patterson—as a matter of substantive, not formalistic, statutory interpretation—
was indistinguishable from Mullaney because the defendant bore the burden of
41
proving a fact that reduced his sentence.
The elements/sentencing factors constitutional challenge raised in McMillan
42
v. Pennsylvania concerned a mandatory minimum sentence provision. State
law provided that for certain felonies a mandatory sentence of at least five
years (but no more than the maximum sentence for the given offense) must be
imposed if the offense was committed while the defendant visibly possessed a
43
firearm. The defendant argued that this fact must be an element of the offense, triggering Winship, before the mandatory minimum could be imposed.
44
The majority
The Court dismissed this argument in a 5-4 opinion.
“rejected the claim that whenever a State links the severity of punishment to
the presence or absence of an identified fact the State must prove that fact be45
yond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, the fact of visible possession of a firearm—
which triggers the mandatory minimum—could be determined as a sentencing
factor. Although it acknowledged that there might be some constitutional
outer limits on the state’s power to define certain facts as sentencing factors
rather than as elements, the McMillan Court did not find any constitutional
46
violation in the case. The dissenters, on the other hand, argued that Winship
was not limited to statutory elements; if the state seeks to treat certain facts as
prohibited conduct that increase or restrict the sentence, it must prove those
47
facts as elements of the crime, whether they affect guilt or the sentence.
37. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Justice Rehnquist did not
participate in the case.
38. 432 U.S. at 207-08.
39. See id. at 207.
40. See id. at 205-06.
41. See id. at 221-22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
43. See id. at 81-82.
44. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Powell, and O’Connor. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
45. 477 U.S. at 84 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
46. See id. at 87-90.
47. See id. at 95, 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The constitutionality of sentence enhancement provisions was posed in Al48
mendarez-Torres v. United States. The federal alien reentry statute at issue in
the case makes it a felony for a deported alien to reenter the United States
49
without permission; the punishment is up to two years in prison. If the alien
had been convicted of an aggravated felony before deportation, however, the
50
illegal reentry may be punished by up to twenty years. Although it sought to
have Almendarez-Torres sentenced under the latter provision, the United
States had neither alleged his prior felony in the indictment nor proven at it
trial. Instead, the government produced proof of the prior felony only at sentencing; Almendarez-Torres received a prison sentence of just over seven
51
years. On appeal, Almendarez-Torres argued that any sentence longer than
two years was invalid because the recidivism enhancement was an element of
52
the twenty-years-sentence offense.
53
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the recidivism enhancement was only
a sentencing factor and that the sentence imposed was valid. As in Patterson
and McMillan, the Court upheld the statute’s constitutionality without defining
a precise test: Whatever constitutional limitations might exist on making a fact
a sentencing factor rather than an element, proving recidivism as a sentencing
54
factor under this statute was constitutional. The Court particularly empha55
sized that recidivism long has been a sentencing factor not proven to the jury.
The dissenters, in contrast, insisted that the recidivism sentence enhancement
must be an element of the offense as a matter of statutory interpretation be56
cause of the doctrine of “constitutional doubt.” The dissent argued that the
maximum sentence for illegal reentry simpliciter—the only facts proved to the
jury—is two years, yet Almendarez-Torres was sentenced to seven; this raised
grave doubts about whether the prior felony conviction also must be proved as
57
an element before the maximum sentence may be increased beyond two years.
The dissent declined to reach the constitutional question, however, because
58
statutory interpretation could avoid it.

48. 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).
49. See id. at 1222.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1223.
52. See id.
53. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
54. See 118 S. Ct. at 1230-32.
55. See id. at 1224, 1230-31.
56. See id. at 1234 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The doctrine of constitutional doubt is a principle of
statutory construction under which the Court will decline to adopt an interpretation of a law that raises
serious doubts about whether the law, as so interpreted, is constitutional. See id. at 1227-28. When the
Court must interpret a statute “susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter.” Id. at 1234 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
57. See id. at 1237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 1244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Almendarez-Torres dissenters were forced to reach this constitutional
59
question in Monge v. California. California’s “three-strikes” law provided increased sentences for repeat offenders and required the state to prove those
60
prior convictions as elements of the offense. After Monge’s conviction, the
appellate court reversed the application of the recidivism law because the state
61
had produced legally insufficient evidence on the prior conviction allegation.
The state then made a second attempt to prove the applicability of the recidivism provision at resentencing, but the state supreme court held that the fed62
eral Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a retrial on the sentencing allegation.
The United States Supreme Court held in Monge by an 8-1 margin that
63
double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings. However, the Court agreed only by a 5-4 margin that Monge’s case involved sen64
tencing. As in prior cases, the majority declined to state a rule, but held that
in this case no constitutional principle was violated by treating the recidivism
65
allegation as a sentencing factor rather than as an element. The AlmendarezTorres dissenters, however, saw the same problem here as in that case: Monge
was convicted of using a minor to sell marijuana, a crime with a maximum sentence of seven years, but he was sentenced to eleven years because of his prior
66
felonies. Unlike Almendarez-Torres, moreover, in Monge the Court could not
construe the state law to avoid a constitutional difficulty. Therefore, the dissent argued that because Monge was sentenced for a greater term than was
available for the facts of the crime proved to the jury, his sentence should not
stand unless the facts used to enhance his sentence beyond that maximum are
67
proved as elements of a separate, longer-sentence-for-recidivism crime.
In the 1998 Term, the Court again faced the elements/sentencing factors
68
constitutional question in Jones v. United States. The federal carjacking statute at issue in Jones provides for a basic sentence of up to fifteen years, but for
up to twenty-five years “if serious bodily injury . . . results” from the carjack69
ing. The petitioner, Nathaniel Jones, was sentenced to twenty-five years im70
prisonment after his carjacking conviction. The United States had not proven
59. 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
60. See id. at 2248.
61. See id. at 2249.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 2248 (O’Connor, J., so holding for five-member majority); id. at 2255 (Scalia, J., for
three dissenters, agreeing that noncapital sentencing does not implicate double jeopardy); id. at 2254
(Stevens, J., dissenting, arguing that the state has only one chance to meet its burden of proof, at trial
or at sentencing). The Court expressly limited the holding of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981), to its facts: Double jeopardy applies to sentencing only in capital cases. See 118 S. Ct. at 225153.
64. Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
65. See 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
66. See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999).
69. The relevant provision in Jones was 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. IV 1992).
70. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Jones (No. 97-6203).
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the victim’s serious bodily injury at trial, however, but only at the sentencing
71
hearing. Jones’s appeal argued that this fact had to be proven not as a sentencing factor, but as an element of the offense, before a sentence greater than
fifteen years could be imposed on him. A substantial portion of the petitioner’s
and the United States’s briefs were devoted to the first question presented, the
statutory construction issue: whether Congress intended the serious-bodilyinjury fact to be an element of an aggravated carjacking offense, or merely a
72
sentencing factor for a single carjacking offense. At oral argument, however,
the Court’s questions immediately focused on the second question presented—
whether, if serious bodily injury is a sentencing factor and not an element, such
an arrangement is constitutional; the Court showed no interest in the statutory
73
interpretation issue. Ultimately, however, the Court did not decide Jones on
74
constitutional grounds. The elements/sentencing factors constitutional question, therefore, is still unresolved.
The historical progression from Winship to Jones has provided the foundational facts and analysis for answering the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question that a majority of the Court has declined to confront directly.
Some of these cases involved the legislature treating a fact as important to guilt
or sentencing, yet shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Others allowed sentences to be imposed that were greater than what otherwise appeared
to be the maximum for the “base offense,” even when the government relied on
facts not proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In the end, however,
each case addressed the same core question: Must this fact be proved as an
element of the offense, or may it be a sentencing factor?
III
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS
The elements/sentencing factors line of cases suggests a variety of tests for
determining whether treating a fact as other than an element of the offense is
constitutionally permissible. None of these tests, however, has garnered consistent support within the Court.
The seven proposed tests fall into three categories. In the first category, no
direct constitutional limitation on the legislature’s power to define elements or
sentencing factors is imposed. In the second category, the constitutional limitation is based on the consequences of the factual determination. In the third
category, the type of factual determination involved determines whether the
fact must be an element.

71. See id. at 5-6.
72. See id. at 10-30; Brief for the United States at 12-36, Jones (No. 97-6203); see also Brief for the
National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-16, Jones
(No. 97-6203).
73. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones (No. 97-6203), available at 1998 WL 713483.
74. See infra Part VI.
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A. No Direct Limitation Tests
The first category of tests includes those that assert that the Constitution
places no direct limitation on a legislature’s power to define or redefine the
elements of criminal offenses. Although some constitutional principles (such as
the Ex Post Facto Clause or the requirement of fair notice of prohibited con75
duct under the Due Process Clause) do restrict this power indirectly, these
tests assert that nothing in the Constitution compels any rigorous judicial review of the criminal offenses enacted by the legislature. The tests accept the
McMillan Court’s analysis: “[I]n determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature’s definition of the elements of the
76
offense is usually dispositive.” If the statute makes the fact an element, it is
an element; if the statute makes the fact a sentencing factor, it is a sentencing
factor. If the statute is unclear, the matter is merely one of statutory interpretation and legislative intent: There can be no application of the doctrine of
constitutional doubt or the rule of lenity because the legislature’s choice is perfectly constitutional either way—that is, there need not be any presumption in
favor of elements in unclear cases.
1. The Pro-Government Position. The United States argued in Jones that
there is no independent constitutional principle that limits whether facts may
be sentencing factors or must be elements. To establish guilt, the government
must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt those facts required by the
77
statutory offense. Once guilt has been established, the sentence imposed may
be based on any additional facts deemed relevant—by a judge within his
discretion, under a Sentencing Guidelines structure, or as listed in the specific
offense itself. Thus, upon proof of the elements of the carjacking statute
(possessing a firearm, taking a motor vehicle, the vehicle’s interstate commerce
78
nexus, taking the vehicle from another by force and violence or intimidation),
the defendant is guilty. The severity of the injury suffered by the victim is only
a sentencing factor: That the defendant can receive no more than fifteen years
absent proof of serious bodily injury does not make serious bodily injury an
element of the crime. Instead, the statute “defin[es] one offense with three
79
possible authorized sentencing ranges.” That the proof of additional facts

75. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
76. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
77. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 976203), available at 1998 WL 713483. The United States argued the following:
[ ]
[ ]
You have a statute that says, “ whoever. ” [Following that,] [i]t lists certain actions . . . and
[ ]
[ ]
usually a state of mind, then it says “ shall, ” and gives you a set of punishments. I think
that’s a very good indication that what comes in between the whoever and the shall is an element that has to be proved to the jury in order to establish guilt of the crime. Our submission
on that fundamentally is . . . the elements of a crime are what the legislature says they are . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
78. See Brief for the United States at 15, Jones (No. 97-6203) (interpreting these facts as the only
elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. IV 1992)).
79. Id. at 16.

PRIESTERNOTE.FMT.DOC

260

05/18/99 3:41 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 4

required to move between ranges is made at sentencing rather than at trial is
left to the legislature’s discretion. Otherwise,
[a]ny rule that Congress cannot prescribe subsidiary metes and bounds within an
overall statutory sentencing range—as opposed to allowing judges to set any such intermediate limits in their own discretion—would render application of the mandatory
federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, unless every factor taken into account
in setting a defendant’s Guidelines range [is] charged in the indictment and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. . . . Yet under [the] Court’s decisions, that is incorrect.80

The United States did acknowledge some constitutional limitations on its
position. Most importantly, the United States conceded that in every case, the
sentence imposed must be proportional to the offense of conviction under the
81
Eighth Amendment. During oral argument in Jones, petitioner’s counsel suggested a particularly troublesome statute:
But we have 18 U.S. Code section 247. It says that someone who intentionally defaces real property, or intentionally obstructs a person in the enjoyment of their religious freedom, . . . shall be punished as in subsection (d). Subsection (d) says that if
death results, or if the acts include kidnapping or intent to kidnap, you can receive life
or death. If bodily injury results, . . . it can be 40 years. If it’s bodily injury under
other circumstances it can be 20 years, and in any other case, it is 1 year or a fine.
Now, the Solicitor General’s position is . . . that the jury would only determine
whether there was this intentional defacing [of] real property, or interference with religious rights, . . . which would only trigger a fine or a 1-year sentence, but the judge
then would make all of these critical findings which would really determine this person’s deprivation of liberty.82

The Court then challenged the government about whether this statute
posed a constitutional difficulty:
QUESTION: If nothing else happens, punished by 1 year. If there’s physical injury,
30 years. If there’s a death, life, and whether there’s physical injury, or whether
there’s death, is taken away from the jury and your right to jury trial does not exist for
those. Is that a problem?
MR. DuMONT: Well, I think first of all that’s in the civil rights sections of the statutes, the statutes intended to address defacement of religious property for the reasons
of race or creed. It’s a very serious offense. Congress was responding simply to some
known problems.
QUESTION: So serious you get 1 year for it.
MR. DuMONT: So—
QUESTION: Unless somebody dies, in which case you get life, and you don’t get a
jury trial as to whether anybody has died.
QUESTION: Yes, and you can commit it by just throwing a bucket of paint on a wall.
That would do it.
MR. DuMONT: Well, that’s right, . . . one can multiply the examples here. The assault statute, for instance, that is a simple assault, but if someone dies there could be
80. Id. at 46.
81. See id. at 41-42 (arguing, in section titled “The Range of Available Sentences Under Section
2119 Is Not Unconstitutional,” that even the maximum possible sentence—life imprisonment, available if death results—is proportional to the very serious offense of violent carjacking with a firearm).
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Jones (No. 97-6203), available at 1998 WL 713483.
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life imprisonment. The examples are there. I think what troubles us about those examples when we hear them is a notion of proportionality, that it would be disproportionate to send someone to jail for life, for instance, when the offense of conviction is
merely a defacement of property or a simple assault.83

Under the pro-government position, proportionality to the offense of conviction is the only principle that restricts how much importance a sentencing
factor can have. Carjacking, of course, is a very serious offense, so the United
States insisted that there was no proportionality problem in Jones by increasing
84
the sentence from the fifteen-year to the twenty-five year gradation.
The United States also agreed in passing that certain other established constitutional principles indirectly limit the legislature’s power, such as the Ex Post
Facto Clause, individual constitutional rights, and the due process requirement
85
of fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. So long as neither proportionality
nor any of these collateral constitutional rules is violated, however, the legislature is free to make any given fact an element of the offense or a sentencing
factor.
The pro-government position does not provide substantive or procedural
limitations on the legislature’s discretion to make factual findings into elements
or sentencing factors. In essence, the position denies that a constitutional
problem is raised by the elements/sentencing factors issue; although the possibility of abuse exists, that abuse, if it even exists at all, has not so undermined
defendants’ constitutional rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that any additional constitutional safeguards are necessary. The progovernment position asserts that the political process has not become so distorted against criminal defendants that judicial activism is needed to restore the
balance. If abuse is found in a particular case, moreover, that may be remedied
by holding that the sentence imposed is disproportional to the offense of conviction. The position rejects the conclusion that a broad theory of constitutional elements is necessary.
2. The Procedural Due Process Position. No Justice has yet applied to the
elements/sentencing factors issue a method of constitutional analysis that
would impose no substantive limitations on the element/sentencing factor
determination of the legislature, but that would safeguard defendants’ interests:
procedural due process. In essence, this position would acknowledge all of the
fears and concerns (for example, the redefinition of traditional elements into
sentencing factors, undermining the right to jury trial by moving important
factual findings to the sentencing phase only, and so on) that have led Justices
to urge the substantive constitutional tests discussed below. Rather than
imposing substantive limits on the elements/sentencing factors side, however,
83. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
84. See id. at 31.
85. See Brief for the United States at 48-49, Jones (No. 97-6203). The United States also conceded
that fundamental principles of justice might preclude the legislature from eliminating elements of historically defined crimes. See id. at 48; cf. infra Part V.B.6 (describing such historically grounded principles).
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the procedural due process position would increase the amount of process that
is due at sentencing. The disparity between trial and sentencing procedures
would be mitigated because the punishment imposed at sentencing would
receive rigorous procedural protections; the significance of a sentencing factor
rather than an element determination is greatly reduced. Although the Court
historically has not held that much process was due at sentencing compared to
the guilt/innocence phase, the procedural due process position argues that this
result is no longer acceptable today: Because factual determinations at
sentencing have taken on a much more significant role in depriving—or in their
potential to deprive—the defendant of liberty, more process is due today than
previously.
But how could such an increase in procedural due process at sentencing be
justified constitutionally? One possible answer is traditional: the Mathews v.
86
Eldridge balancing test. In deciding whether the process provided is sufficient, the Court considers the private interest in jeopardy, the government’s interest in the merits and in not providing excessive process, and the risk of er87
ror.
Given all the fears the Court has expressed in its opinions and the
increased importance of the federal and state sentencing guidelines, the Court
easily and properly could conclude that the defendant’s interest at sentencing is
of critical importance. The Court could acknowledge that it previously underestimated the importance of sentencing, or it could accept the argument that
the Sentencing Guidelines and related developments have increased the significance of sentencing determinations. Of course, an adequate factual trial record
might not be assembled by a defendant, but many willing scholars and institutes
gladly would file briefs amicus curiae with the Court confirming the critical importance and procedural inadequacy of contemporary sentencing. On the
other hand, any asserted governmental interest in proving facts as sentencing
factors rather than as elements, such as avoiding jury trials or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or denying defendants some heightened sentencing procedural protections, are comparatively insignificant and are unlikely to carry
much weight with the Court. Finally, the very concerns expressed by the Court
are that shifting important factual determinations to sentencing rather than
trial forces the defendant to bear too much of the risk of erroneous findings.
Weighing these three considerations easily could lead the Court to conclude
that inadequate process is being provided at sentencing. Of course, the question of how much more process is constitutionally due is more difficult to answer. The Court is unlikely to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof and the jury trial requirement to all sentencing determinations—the
88
Court has not done that even in capital cases. However, the Court could re86. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
87. See id. at 335; cf. also United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 411 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to justify
the extension of Confrontation Clause rights to Guidelines sentencing proceedings).
88. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1232, 1237 n.2 (1998) (discussing
cases—once a jury has convicted a defendant of a capital crime, the state constitutionally may provide
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quire more adversariness (such as Confrontation Clause rights or prior notice
of the state’s sentencing allegations), a higher burden of proof for factual find89
90
ings (such as clear and convincing evidence), or other protections. Yet none
of these heightened procedural rules would alter the legislature’s ability to define facts as elements or as sentencing factors. Increased procedural due process instead would moderate the dangers by reducing the disparity between trial
and sentencing procedures, making the element/sentencing factor difference
much less significant and far less of a risk to defendants’ interests.
B. Consequences of Facts Tests
The second category of tests includes those that examine not only the statutory elements and sentencing factors defined by the legislature, but also the
consequences that factual findings have for the defendant. Rejecting the argument that which facts are elements or sentencing factors depends only on the
legislature’s words and intent, the Justices applying these tests insist that when
certain types of factual findings produce certain effects, those findings must be
made beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury—that is, such findings must be elements of the offense. There is considerable disagreement, however, over what
kinds of consequences would mandate that a factual determination be deemed
an element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor.
1. The Factors Analysis Position. The factors analysis used in several cases
in many ways is not a test at all. Rather, it is a way for the Court to
acknowledge that, in some circumstances, a statute might be constitutionally
objectionable for failing to treat a certain factual determination as an element
of the offense without the Court having to specify precisely what those
circumstances and facts might be. In essence, the Court has accomplished the
classic legal diversion:
“One could imagine circumstances in which
fundamental fairness would require that a particular fact be treated as an
91
element of the offense” —implicitly adding, “but that is not this case.” The
Court has enumerated many relevant factors that might require that a factual
determination be proved as an element of the offense. It is clear, however, that
these factors are part of a gestalt analysis; none is dispositive.
The Patterson Court, for example, used several factors to demonstrate that
the New York affirmative defense rule did not violate due process. First, the

that the judge alone determines whether death will be imposed; that is, the decision to sentence to
death need not be made by a jury or by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
89. Cf. id. at 1233 (“[W]e express no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might
apply to sentencing determinations which bear significantly on the severity of the sentence.”).
90. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence”, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993) (arguing
that the federal Sentencing Guidelines do not adequately protect defendants’ procedural rights at sentencing).
91. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2250 (1998).
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92

statute did not proclaim the guilt of an individual. Second, the law did not
presume guilt; thus, it did not “unhinge the procedural presumption of inno93
cence.” The law also did not provide that proof of indictment or identity
would be sufficient to “create a presumption of the existence of all the facts es94
sential to guilt”; that is, it did not violate Mullaney by presuming without
proof a statutory element of the offense. Third, the statute did not undermine
95
the privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, there was no evidence that
permitting New York to make extreme emotional distrurbance an affirmative
defense would “lead to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime
and reduction of the prosecution’s burden that a new constitutional rule was
96
required.” Thus, the Court concluded, affirmative defenses need not be elements of the offense just because a factual finding is allowed to mitigate a sentence.
The Court considered in McMillan a wider range of factors when analyzing
the constitutionality of the visibly-possessing-a-firearm sentencing factor in
Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing law. That law did not weaken
the presumption of innocence or “relieve the prosecution of its burden of
97
proving guilt.” It also did not create a dramatic sentencing differential (as had
98
the Maine law in Mullaney) or alter the maximum sentence for the offense. In
addition, the statute did not define a separate offense with a different penalty,
99
but only limited the sentencing judge’s discretion within the offense’s range.
Furthermore, the law did not establish a sentencing scheme without procedural
100
due process.
The Court also noted that the state had not tried to “evade”
Winship by redefining into a sentencing factor a fact traditionally proven as an
101
element of an offense.
Finally, the Court concluded, “The statute gives no
impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be
102
a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”
After presenting and
discussing these factors, the Court held that, despite the lack of a clear test,
there was “no doubt” that the Pennsylvania law “falls on the permissible side of
103
the constitutional line.”
92. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar
Rfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916)) (“[I]t is not within the province of the legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.”).
93. Id. at 211 n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
94. Id. at 210 (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943)).
95. See id. at 211 n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring)).
96. Id. at 211.
97. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
98. See id. at 87-88.
99. See id. at 88.
100. See id. (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), as a case in which insufficient procedural due process at sentencing had been provided).
101. See id. at 89-90.
102. Id. at 88.
103. Id. at 91.
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The Almendarez-Torres majority opinion applied the factors analysis based
on the factors considered in McMillan. The Court conceded that, unlike the
mandatory minimum provision in McMillan, the sentence enhancement for recidivism in the alien reentry statute did increase the maximum sentence to
104
which the defendant was exposed. In addition, the law had a greater range of
sentences available than the statute at issue in McMillan, but the range was still
105
well within constitutional bounds.
On the other hand, the majority emphasized that, far from being a traditional element of criminal offenses, recidivism
traditionally has been proven as a sentencing factor to protect the defendant
106
from prejudice. Finally, the Court cursorily concluded that the other McMil107
lan factors all weighed in the government’s favor. Thus, despite the fact that
the maximum sentence was increased on the basis of a factual finding not made
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the Almendarez-Torres Court found that
the other factors supported the constitutionality of proving recidivism as a sentencing factor.
After Almendarez-Torres, the Court might adopt a factors analysis “test” to
determine whether a factual determination constitutionally must be proved as
an element of the offense. The initial factors are based on established constitutional principles and the presence of any one factor would invalidate the law.
The Court determines whether the disputed law (1) declares or presumes guilt
on the law or the facts, (2) undermines the presumption of innocence, or (3)
weakens the privilege against self-incrimination. If none of these is present, the
Court then would examine whether the finding on the factual determination
does the following: (4) provides sufficient procedural due process, (5) alters the
maximum penalty to which the defendant is exposed, (6) creates a great differential in the range of sentences available, (7) appears to create a separate offense with a distinct penalty, (8) redefines a fact traditionally treated as an element of the offense into a sentencing factor, or (9) allows “the tail to wag the
dog” because the sentencing factors substantially outweigh the elements of the
offense in importance.
The last six factors (4–9) clearly are not precise. Because none is dispositive, however, they need not be; even if one or two factors are troublesome, so
long as the Court is confident that on balance the six factors in the aggregate do
not point to unconstitutionality, the fact may be a sentencing factor. The end
result might be compared to a “shocks the conscience of the Court” standard of
review. The six factors thus are more detailed proxies for the truly troublesome effect—allowing the sentencing tail to wag the substantive offense dog.
That the Court has yet to find a factors analysis violation, however, is revealing,
especially given the vigorous disagreements about some of the statutes it has
already reviewed. Only an extreme case could convince a majority of the cur104.
105.
106.
107.

See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230-31 (1998).
See id. at 1230, 1231-32.
See id. at 1221, 1226, 1230-31.
See id. at 1232.
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rent Court that the tail is actually wagging the dog. The factors analysis test,
therefore, is not yet—if it ever could be—a strenuous form of constitutional judicial review.
2. The Maximum Sentences Position. Justice Scalia’s recent dissents in
Almendarez-Torres and Monge propose a rigorous consequences-based test. A
criminal statute provides that upon proof of certain facts (the statutory
elements of the offense), the defendant is guilty and then may be sentenced in
accordance with the statute. If the statute provides only one maximum
sentence, then any sentencing factors that limit discretion within that range—
such as a McMillan mandatory minimum when certain facts are proved at
sentencing—do not raise constitutional problems. If, however, the statute
provides more than one maximum sentence, the differences between which
depend on additional factual findings, then those gradations must be elements
of the offense. Thus, when considering Monge’s conviction for drug dealing
and the recidivism enhancement, Justice Scalia concluded:
Petitioner Monge was convicted of the crime of using a minor to sell marijuana, which
carries a maximum possible sentence of seven years . . . . He was later sentenced to
eleven years in prison, however, on the basis of several additional facts that California
and the Court have chosen to label “sentence enhancement allegations.” However
California chooses to divide and label its criminal code, I believe that for federal constitutional purposes those extra four years are attributable to conviction of a new
crime.108

This analysis also compels the conclusion that the Almendarez-Torres recidivism enhancement is an element of the offense (because there could be no
sentence in excess of two years without proving the additional fact of recidi109
vism) and that the Jones serious bodily injury enhancement is as well
(because there can be no sentence longer than fifteen years without proof of
that additional fact).
But is the maximum sentences position coherent? Cannot the test be
evaded by carefully providing which term is the “maximum”? The Jones statute, for example, could be rewritten to provide that the maximum sentence is
twenty-five years, but no sentence of more than fifteen years may be imposed
without proof of serious bodily injury. So rewritten, the statute apparently
meets Justice Scalia’s test: Within the “maximum” (twenty-five years) for the
offense, there are limits on discretion, but that “maximum” is not extended by
proof of serious bodily injury. While it sounds convincing, this argument distorts the maximum sentences position. The maximum sentences position defines the maximum for the offense not by what the statute says it is, but by reference to the facts proved to the jury. The threshold is not what constitutes the
maximum sentence for the offense as a whole, but what is the maximum sentence that the sentencing judge may impose for the offense given the facts
proved to the jury. Think of Jones: The jury saw a set of facts sufficient to sup108. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1244 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reaching that conclusion on
statutory interpretation grounds).
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port the fifteen-year sentence. Any attempt to sentence longer than that is to
sentence Jones to an aggravated offense for which the jury did not convict him;
it did not pass on the fact of serious bodily injury. Thus, no matter how the
statute in Jones is rewritten, the statute itself still imposes what could be called
a “mandatory subsidiary maximum”—no sentence longer than fifteen years
unless serious bodily injury is proved. The maximum sentences position de110
mands that this proof be made to the jury.
The result of the maximum sentences position is that the jury must hear all
facts necessary to impose whatever binding maximum possible sentence the
statute provides. A decision to impose anything less than a binding maximum,
however, is different. The jury’s findings of fact determine only the upper limit
on the sentence that may be imposed—and if gradations within the statute require factual findings to increase from one (mandatory maximum) grade to another, those facts must go to the jury as well. In other words, a mandatory
minimum (like McMillan) limits sentencing discretion without creating a new
element of the offense, because the maximum is unchanged—the jury need not
play a role in deciding what sentence is appropriate within the permissible
range. Likewise, the federal Sentencing Guidelines never permit the sentence
111
to be extended beyond the offense’s maximum. For Justice Scalia, nonjurytriable sentencing factors may play a role in deciding how close to or far below
the available maximum the sentence is, but increasing a sentence above a mandatory maximum (whether for the offense as a whole or for binding gradations
within it) requires the determinative facts to be proved as elements.
C. Types of Facts Tests
Tests in the third category assert that certain types of facts always must be
elements of the crime. These tests make categorical determinations about the
nature of criminal conduct and criminal procedure: Because some kinds of
facts are central to criminal law, those facts must receive full constitutional procedural protections, including a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Other facts not at the core of criminal law need not receive these protections.
Judicial review is authorized to ensure that the designated types of facts are always proved as elements of the offense, regardless of how the statute is written.
1. The Any-Nonmitigating-Fact Position. Justice Stevens, dissenting in
McMillan, proposed a very strict standard for determining which facts must be
elements of the offense. He argued that any fact that is used as a nonmitigating

110. Thus, in both Almendarez-Torres and Monge, Justice Scalia insisted that the sentenceenhancing prior convictions must be proved as elements—to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf.
infra text accompanying note 204 (quoting Justice Scalia’s argument that, if proving prior offenses as
elements would be prejudicial to the defendant, the trial can be bifurcated for that proof, preserving
defendant’s right to jury trial and reasonable doubt proof on the mandatory subsidiary maximum).
111. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (1998). For Justice Scalia, this principle
is a constitutional requirement. See infra Part V.
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factor in the defendant’s sentence must be an element of the offense. “Once
a State defines a criminal offense, the Due Process Clause requires it to prove
any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to both a special
113
stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This is
necessary to protect the principle adopted in Winship: The prosecution’s use
of nonmitigating facts about conduct requires proof beyond a reasonable
114
doubt. This test applies Winship not only to the state’s qualitative burden of
proving whether the defendant is guilty at all, but also to the quantitative
outcome—that is, the significance of the stigma and the period of incarceration
that the state wishes to impose on the defendant. Because the mandatory
minimum law in McMillan imposed an additional stigma (using a firearm
makes it a more dangerous transaction) and a special punishment (a minimum
term is automatically imposed, whatever the circumstances of the particular
offender), it violated the test. Justice Stevens conceded, however, that
Patterson was correctly decided: Winship applies to “conduct which exposes a
criminal defendant to greater stigma or punishment, but does not likewise
115
constrain state reductions of criminal penalties.” In other words, aggravating
or binding sentencing facts must always be elements, but mitigating facts may
be sentencing factors.
Justice Stevens’s test is viable, however, only if the distinction between
mitigating and nonmitigating facts is valid. Justice Stevens argued that it is,
116
while conceding that the distinction is “formalistic.”
The legislature “may
reach the same destination either by criminalizing conduct and allowing an affirmative defense, or by prohibiting lesser conduct and enhancing the pen117
alty.” Justice Stevens insisted that only the former legislation is constitutionally permitted: There the defendant bears the burden of reducing his sentence
from what the state has proven to the jury. In the latter situation, on the other
hand, the defendant may be sentenced on the basis of facts the jury never decided upon. To society, moreover, the nature of the two approaches is very different because the political process serves as a check only on the first: “No
democratically elected legislature,” argued Justice Stevens, would ever enact a
law “making presence in any public or private place a felony punishable by up
to five years imprisonment and yet allowing an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove, to a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not robbing a
112. Justice Stevens apparently continues to hold the any-nonmitigating-fact position, including for
recidivism sentence enhancements. He joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-Torres, which
argued that there was serious constitutional doubt about whether the increased sentence imposed in
that case was permissible. In Monge, Justice Stevens’s separate dissent noted that “Justice Scalia accurately characterizes the potential consequences of today’s decision as ‘sinister.’ It is not, however,
California that has taken ‘the first steps’ down the road the Court follows today. It was the Court’s
decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.” 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 n.8 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
113. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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118

bank.”
By contrast, legislatures have no political process check against
eroding the sentencing rights of convicted criminals: “As this case [McMillan]
demonstrates, a State may seek to enhance the deterrent effect of its law forbidding the use of firearms in the course of felonies by mandating a minimum
sentence of imprisonment upon proof by a preponderance against those already
119
convicted of specified crimes.”
Thus, a fact that mitigates a crime already proved to a jury does not implicate Winship because the state has succeeded in fully proving all facts necessary
to impose the full punishment available under the law; the decision to allow
mitigation is at the state’s pleasure. In contrast, a fact that imposes a stigma
and punishment (like a mandatory minimum), or that has an aggravating effect
on the sentence, violates the very purpose of Winship: Each fact upon which
the nature of prohibited conduct or an increase in the imposed penalty is based
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, any fact that plays
anything other than a mitigating role at sentencing must be an element of the offense.
2. The Historical Elements Position. Justice Powell, the author of the
Mullaney opinion, dissented in Patterson and proposed a categorical test for
determining when a fact must be an element of the offense. The New York
affirmative defense provision in Patterson, Justice Powell argued, was
indistinguishable in its effect from the Maine burden-shifting law in Mullaney—
120
the defendant bore the burden of persuasion in each case.
To limit the
holding of Mullaney to a prohibition on the presumption of facts for statutory
elements destroys Winship: The legislature may shift with impunity the
elements of crimes into affirmative defenses (or sentencing factors) and
constitutional criminal procedure protections may be evaded by creative
121
legislative drafting. Instead, Justice Powell suggested a constitutional test:
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecutor bear the burden of persuasion
beyond a reasonable doubt only if the factor at issue makes a substantial difference in
punishment and stigma. The requirement of course applies a fortiori if the factor
makes the difference between guilt and innocence. But a substantial difference in
punishment alone is not enough. It also must be shown that in the Anglo-American
legal tradition the factor in question historically has held that level of importance. . . .
[T]o permit a shift in the burden of persuasion when both branches of this test are
satisfied would invite the undermining of the presumption of innocence. 122

Thus, if the state distinguishes murder from manslaughter based on the defendant’s state of mind, the burden of that distinction must lie with the state.
But if the state repeals its state of mind distinction, in favor of a single offense
123
and punishment for all homicides, Justice Powell’s objection is inapplicable.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 221-22 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 223-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 226-27 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 228-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The historical elements position requires that if a fact has substantial importance to the guilt or sentencing determination and it is a fact that historically
has had such significance, then the fact must be an element of the offense if the
statute makes that fact relevant.
3. The Facts-of-the-Offense Position. The defendant-petitioner in Jones
argued that every fact related to the criminal transaction must be proved as an
element of the offense. The test is whether the fact in question “is a fact
associated with the commission of the crime, rather than the history of the
124
offender.” A fact must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt if it
125
is “closely related to and intertwined with the facts of the offense,” such as
the nature and quantity of drugs, the age of a minor drug distributor, or the
126
value of stolen property —or whether serious bodily injury resulted from a
carjacking. On the other hand, offender characteristics—such as mental illness,
insanity (Leland), the defendant’s age, the possibility of rehabilitation,
recidivism (Almendarez-Torres), or other aggravating or mitigating personal
attributes—need not be proved to the jury.
At oral argument, Jones’s counsel summarized the test:
It appears that what the legislature does in enacting a criminal offense is, it tells the
citizenry that if you engage in particular conduct, then you will be sentenced—you
will potentially face a particular sentence, a certain loss of liberty . . . . [T]he Constitution [requires] that to establish that conduct which leads to that loss of liberty [the
case] goes to a jury and is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We think that what the
Court should hold is, if there’s any fact that the legislature singles out from a transaction, from the citizen’s conduct, whether it is an action, whether it is a mental state, or
whether it’s a result, that should be treated as an element of the offense, and it ought to
go to a jury.127

Under the facts-of-the-offense position, facts relating to the commission of
the offense—acts, results, states of mind, and other nonoffender-related facts—
always must be proved as elements of the offense if the state intends to use the
occurrence of such facts to justify the sentencing determination. Facts concerning the nature of the offender personally, on the other hand, may be sentencing factors even if they affect the level of sentence to be imposed.
D. Considering the Proposed Constitutional Tests
The major cases and the proposed constitutional tests do not answer one
important preliminary question about the elements/sentencing factors issue:
Why do we need a constitutional test at all? The Court has yet to strike down a
single law on the ground that it violated the Constitution by treating a fact as a
sentencing factor rather than as an element of the offense. Similarly, a majority
of the Court has never adopted a rigorous constitutional position; the only
124. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 97-6203).
125. Id. at 17.
126. See id. at 17 n.12 (citing Courts of Appeals cases holding such facts to be elements of offenses).
127. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Jones (No. 97-6203), available at 1998 WL 713483
(emphasis added).
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“test” used more than once is the highly deferential factors analysis of McMillan and Almendarez-Torres. Why not conclude that the fears of abuse and redefinition are not occurring, or are occurring so infrequently that the Chicken
Little predictions of the destruction and evasion of constitutional criminal pro128
cedure simply have not come to fruition?
Why cannot we be satisfied with
the Court’s pragmatic outcomes: “Fundamental fairness has not been violated
here, though we can’t tell you exactly why. Rest assured, though: As with obscenity, we know it when we see it.”
One answer, of course, is that we can be satisfied where we are, without a
constitutional test. Another answer, however, is more compelling: A constitutional test—whichever one is selected—makes hundreds, if not thousands, of
cases each year simpler to resolve. If we adopt the pro-government position,
then all claims of constitutional violations for failing to prove a fact as an element rather than a sentencing factor can be dismissed out of hand; only caseby-case, proportionality-to-the-offense-of-conviction claims remain. The factors analysis test has the same result, because a court will not reverse a sentence unless its conscience is shocked by the procedure used. Under Justice
Scalia’s maximum sentences position, any fact causing an increase above a
binding maximum requires element status; under Justice Stevens’s anynonmitigating-fact position, any factual finding used in sentencing for a purpose other than to mitigate the sentence is reversible error.
Although the Court will, and should, go to great lengths to avoid a constitutional issue if it is not forced to decide it, providing sensible and useful guidance to the lower federal and state courts is also an important function of the
Court. Eventually, the Court will face a case that requires it to confront the
constitutional question or it will realize that the issue is too administratively
important to leave unresolved. The constitutional issue was squarely presented
on the facts of Jones and was fully briefed and argued; the Court would not
have been overreaching to decide the constitutional question in that case, yet it
129
did not do so. Furthermore, the issue has now been raised in three cases, AlElemendarez-Torres, Monge, and Jones, in less than two years.
ments/sentencing factors constitutionality challenges are likely to persist until
the Court decides the issue. The question then becomes: Which constitutional
test is the right one—which should be adopted by the Court? That is, which
130
test is most consistent with the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution?
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: NARROWING THE QUESTION
There is no better place to begin thinking about which constitutional test is
the right one to adopt for resolving the elements/sentencing factors issue than
128. Cf. Chicken Little, in WHAT YOUR 1ST GRADER NEEDS TO KNOW 28-29 (E.D. Hirsch ed.,
1991) (“The sky is falling!”).
129. See infra Part VI.
130. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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the Constitution itself. As is usually the case in constitutional law, the text does
not resolve the elements/sentencing factors question, but it does guide the
framing of the appropriate analysis of the issue. Several of the Constitution’s
provisions refer to crimes and to punishments as independent concepts. Similarly, the procedural provisions impose different requirements for trials of
crimes and determinations of punishment. What is a “crime,” and what is not,
becomes the critical constitutional determination. The Constitution, although
it does not indicate which test is the best one, does help to narrow the question.
First, several provisions of the Constitution governing the legislative branch
discuss powers related to “crimes.” In Article I, Congress is given the power to
131
“provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting” securities and money, and to
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Of132
fenses against the Law of Nations.”
Congress also possesses “all legislative
133
Powers” of the United States, including the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper” for the United States to function—for example,
134
interstate commercial crimes, postal crimes, and so on. The Constitution also
135
makes clear that states, too, have the power to define criminal offenses.
A
legislature’s power to define crimes is expressly limited only twice: Neither
136
Congress nor a state may enact a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, and
137
Article III uniquely and specifically defines the federal crime of treason.
Other provisions of the Constitution also refer to “crimes.” The President
138
may “grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States.”
139
Article III requires a jury trial for “all Crimes,” while the Sixth Amendment
protects the defendant’s rights “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” including the
right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” Finally, the
Fifth Amendment preserves grand jury indictment for “a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime” and prohibits double jeopardy for “the same offence.”
Second, the Constitution includes provisions relating to the legislature’s
power to determine the appropriate punishments for crimes. Congress has the
140
power to set the punishments for counterfeiting and piracy, and “to declare
141
the Punishment of Treason.”
When the Senate convicts a person at an im131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
132. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
133. Id. art. I, § 1.
134. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
135. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for interstate extradition for “A Person charged in any State
with Treason, Felony, or other Crime”); id. amend. XIV, § 2 (acknowledging state power to deny the
vote “for participation in rebellion, or other crime”).
136. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states).
137. See id. art III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”).
138. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. An exception is provided for impeachment: A pardon does not prevent
impeachment and removal from office. See id.
139. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The impeachment exception is also present here because in impeachment
the Senate sits as the jury. See id.
140. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); id. cl. 10 (piracy).
141. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
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peachment trial, the punishment imposed may “not extend further than to re142
moval from Office, and disqualification” from future office. In addition, the
Thirteenth Amendment permits “involuntary servitude . . . as a punishment for
143
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” On the other hand,
the power to define appropriate punishments is also restricted: The “Judgment
in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than” removal from office
144
and disqualification, and “no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
145
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained.”
Under
the Eighth Amendment, the legislature may not have “excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
But do the powers and provisions relating to “crimes” and those involving
“punishments” really address different topics, or just two sides of the same constitutional coin? The text demonstrates that the Constitution treats crimes differently from punishments. Most significantly, while the consequences of an
impeachment conviction in the Senate are limited to removal and disqualification, “the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict146
ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”
Punishment,
therefore, is something that follows the trial for a crime and the judgment of
conviction; it is not part of the trial, but subsequent to it. A similar dichotomy
appears in the Treason Clause. In separate sentences, the Constitution states
that “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
147
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court,” and then
148
provides the power of Congress to “declare the Punishment of Treason.”
Thus, the text of the Constitution reveals that determining the proper punishment for a convicted person is an independent determination from whether to
convict the person.
The distinction between the trial for a crime and the punishment imposed
after the conviction at that trial is confirmed by the procedural provisions of
the Constitution. The procedural restrictions on the government when it puts a
defendant on trial for a “crime” are significant. Article III provides that “[t]he
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . in the State where the said Crimes
149
shall have been committed.” The Fifth Amendment requires the government
to seek the “presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury” for charges of any
“capital, or otherwise infamous crime,” precludes double jeopardy for the
“same offence,” and forbids compelled self-incrimination “in any criminal
case.” Similarly, the Sixth Amendment guarantees “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” the right to a speedy, public, and impartial jury trial in the state and dis142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
Id. amend XIII, § 1.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 2.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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trict where the crime was committed, as well as the rights to be told of the
“accusation,” to confront witnesses, to obtain compulsory process for favorable
witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel. Each of these procedural protections limits the power of the government—jurisdiction and venue, ineligibility
for trial (that is, grand jury and double jeopardy), or courtroom proceedings—
when it tries a person for a crime.
By comparison, the provisions relating to punishment procedures confirm
the distinction created in the Impeachment Clause: Punishment is a phase of
the judicial proceeding that occurs after the trial is over and a judgment of con150
viction is entered, and which therefore need not proceed under the rigorous
trial procedures. In particular, the Constitution permits determinate sentences—that is, every person convicted of a given crime receives the same punishment, regardless of the facts of the case. Congress has the power to
“provide” for the punishment for counterfeiting, to “punish” for piracy, and to
151
“declare” the punishment for treason.
The verbs chosen indicate that Congress could insist that every convicted pirate receive twenty years, or that every
convicted traitor receive life imprisonment. It also is apparent, however, that
the Constitution does not empower Congress to pick and choose the punishment in individual cases: Article III vests the power to decide “Cases” and
152
“Controversies” in the judiciary, and Congress is forbidden from passing bills
153
of attainder.
In other words, determining the range of available sentence
154
(determinate or not) for a crime is a legislative task; imposing the particular
sentence (with or without the exercise of discretion) on the convicted defendant
155
is a judicial task performed after the judgment of conviction is rendered.
150. This analysis—that it is only subsequent to the entering of the judgment of conviction that the
determination of the proper punishment for the offender is made—was followed by the Framers in the
federal crimes enacted by the First Congress. Each crime’s text follows the same pattern: It lists the
elements of the crime, and then states that a person “being thereof convicted, shall be” punished as the
statute provides. An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States § 18, 1 Stat.
112, 116 (1790) (perjury: “every person so offending, and being convicted thereof, shall be imprisoned
not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding eight hundred dollars; and shall stand in the pillory
for one hour”). Some crimes had determinate sentences. See, e.g., id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 112 (treason: “if
any person . . . shall be convicted thereof . . . shall suffer death”); id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 115 (forgery: “and
shall be thereof convicted, every such person shall suffer death”) (emphasis added). Other offenses
allowed judicial discretion in imposing punishment on persons convicted. See, e.g., id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 113
(manslaughter on federal property: “if any person shall . . . commit the crime of manslaughter, and
shall be thereof convicted, such person or persons shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and
fined not exceeding one thousand dollars”). Although it is true that this statute preceded the adoption
of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the First Congress understood that those limitations would likely soon
come into force; it had proposed the Amendments to the states the previous year. See 1 Stat. 97, 97-98
(1789). Thus, the divergence in procedure between criminal trials and subsequent impositions of punishment was understood by the Framers, and adopted by them in the early federal criminal statutes.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); id. cl. 10 (piracy); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (treason).
152. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
153. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
154. “Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime. . . . Congress early
abandoned fixed-sentence rigidity, however, and put in place a system of ranges within which the sentencer could choose the precise punishment.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1988)
(citations omitted).
155. Cf. id. at 364-65 (“[U]nder the indeterminate-sentence system [used in the federal courts prior
to the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines], Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a
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If the Constitution’s great procedural protections apply only to the “trial”
of the defendant for a “crime,” does the Constitution mandate the procedure
used when punishment is imposed in a later sentencing proceeding? If sentencing were entirely determinate, with no judicial discretion, then perhaps no
procedure would be required. When discretion is introduced, however, some
procedure becomes necessary.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a person may not be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” As an initial
matter, a significant amount of process is constitutionally due before a person
may be declared eligible—that is, by conviction of a crime at trial—for any deprivation at all of liberty (imprisonment) or property (criminal fines) by the government, as discussed above. Likewise, when the government uses a judicial
proceeding—rather than a determinate sentence compelled by the legislature—
to calculate the quantity of the deprivation of liberty (term of imprisonment, or
even a deprivation of life if the death penalty may be imposed) or property
(value of fine), at least some process is constitutionally due in that proceeding.
Exactly how much process is due at sentencing has not been resolved conclusively, although it is clear that the Constitution requires some procedural pro156
tections.
Because the Constitution treats the trial for a crime and the imposition of
punishment as separate, distinct matters, the procedural protections necessary
in a criminal trial are not required in full at sentencing—otherwise, the Constitution would not treat them differently. Thus, for example, the Court has concluded that the “Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right
to a jury determination” of “the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an
157
individual.” Sentencing procedure and practice for most of our history, as the
158
Court has recognized, confirms this conclusion.
The Constitution itself provides the tools to distill the elements/sentencing
factors dilemma down to the core constitutional question: What constitutes a
“crime” for constitutional purposes? Anything that falls in the constitutional
category of a “crime” must be proved as an element; anything outside this category could be proved as a sentencing factor. Unfortunately, the constitutional
159
text does not provide the definition. The next step in the analysis, then, is to
determine which of the proposed constitutional tests is best suited to filling this
textual gap.

sentence within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Executive
Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment [by exercising] discretion to release the prisoner before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge.”).
156. See supra notes 19, 100, and accompanying text.
157. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
158. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (reviewing Mistretta).
159. Similarly, original intent or understanding is not helpful—no Justice, not even Justice Scalia,
has relied upon such sources to provide a definition for use in this area.
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V
CHOOSING A CONSTITUTIONAL TEST: DEFINING A “CRIME” IN THE
CONSTITUTION
Each of the seven proposed constitutional tests detailed above provides a
different answer to the core question: When is a factual determination
160
“necessary to constitute the crime” for constitutional purposes (and thus
must be adjudicated as a element of the offense) and when is it merely a fact
161
relating to the “severity of punishment” (and thus satisfactorily may be
proved as a sentencing factor)? Because the choice among the alternatives is
not immediately obvious, the Court should adopt the test that supplies the most
persuasive definition of “crime” for constitutional criminal procedure purposes.
A. Important Preliminary Issues of Constitutional Interpretation
Three issues of constitutional interpretation are important for defining
“crime” for constitutional purposes in resolving the elements/sentencing factor
question. The Court must determine which proposed test most successfully
reconciles and explains these issues.
1. “Crime” and Mitigation. The Court’s recent cases make clear that
mitigating facts are always permissible as sentencing factors. That is, the
Patterson holding has been universally accepted: If the legislature chooses to
allow mitigating factual determinations to influence sentencing outcomes, those
determinations need not be elements of the offense. For example, affirmative
162
163
defenses or cooperation with the government may be sentencing factors
proved by the government by a preponderance of the evidence standard, or
even proved by the defendant. The proposed tests disagree, however, about
which nonmitigating determinations, if any, must be elements.
The text of the Constitution explains why mitigating facts need never be
elements: Mitigation is not part of the concept of a “crime.” No matter how
164
one defines what “crime” means in the Constitution, the baseline is something akin to specified facts and conditions, the joint occurrence of which the
government has forbidden. When other specified facts are permitted to exculpate entirely or reduce partially the punishment of the defendant, however, it is
not logical to categorize those facts as part of the prohibited transaction (that
160. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
161. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
162. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); see supra text accompanying notes 115-118
(discussing Justice Stevens’ acceptance of this conclusion).
163. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (allowing a downward departure
in sentence for “substantial assistance” to the government).
164. A “crime” can be defined generally as “any act done in violation of those duties which an individual owes to the community, and for the breach of which the law has provided that the offender shall
make satisfaction to the public,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (6th ed. 1990), or as “an act or the
commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of a duty that is commanded by a public law and
that makes the offender liable to punishment by that law,” WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 307 (1991).

PRIESTERNOTE.FMT.DOC

Page 249: Autumn 1998]

05/18/99 3:41 PM

JONES V. UNITED STATES

277

is, as part of the “crime”). A mitigating factual determination does not fit the
Constitution’s model of features of a “crime”: It does not “deprive” a person
of liberty or property (to the contrary, it reduces the deprivation otherwise imposed), nor does it place a person in “jeopardy” of life or limb or constitute an
“accusation.” Rather, a mitigating fact reduces the defendant’s exposure to
state sanctions and therefore need not be proved as an element of the offense.
Nonmitigating facts, however, whether they increase the punishment (for example, sentence enhancements) or alter the nature of the sentence (for example, mandatory minimums), do implicate the model features of a “crime.”
Therefore, the proper scope of debate is about which nonmitigating facts must
be elements; it is satisfactory to conclude that mitigating factual determinations
may be sentencing factors.
2. Deference to Statutory “Crimes.” There is little agreement among the
tests about how much deference the Court should afford to the legislature’s
labeling of nonmitigating factual determinations as elements or sentencing
factors. Is the elements/sentencing factors decision made entirely by the letter
of the statute and reserved to the legislature with the political process as a
165
check against abuses, or can the courts look to the substance of the statute
166
and apply a constitutional elements requirement?
Normally, the Court is highly deferential to Congress and the states; a mere
so-called “rational basis” is sufficient to sustain almost all laws against a constitutional attack. In some cases, however, the Court performs a more rigorous
constitutional review to protect individual rights (both in the Bill of Rights and
in the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty by separation of powers
and federalism) by serving as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
When legislative power clashes with the Constitution, “[i]t is emphatically the
167
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
Into
which category of analysis does the elements/sentencing factors situation fall?
Defendants argue that the Constitution’s significant procedural protections
for criminal defendants on trial for a “crime,” particularly the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, will be undermined or abrogated de facto by permitting legislatures too much leeway in determining which factual determinations are merely
165. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1977) (use the law’s elements only; the Court
may not add elements to the statutory offense); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86 (elements are what the
legislature says they are); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1223 (1998) (whether a
fact is an element or a sentencing factor is for Congress to decide).
166. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699 (1975) (the Court is not limited to the formalism of
the statutory text, but may look at the law’s substance and effect); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221-22
(Powell, J., dissenting) (Winship is not limited to the law’s elements, but its application is also determined by the effect of the provision); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same);
Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
167. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For example, in the recent case of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the Court refused to accept Congress’s determination
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), was sufficiently
justified in fact to warrant federal statutory protection against state interference for the free exercise
of religion greater than that required by the Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. See id.
at 2162-72.
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sentencing factors and thus need not be given these significant constitutional
protections. In other areas of constitutional criminal procedure, however, the
Court has preserved deference to the legislature. In particular, the Court constructed a highly deferential test for determining what constitutes the “same offense” for multiple prosecution purposes under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
When a defendant alleges that he may not be tried for the charged offense because he previously has been placed in jeopardy for that offense, the Block168
169
So long as each statutory offense
burger “same elements” test is applied:
requires an element not required by the other, the two offenses are not the
170
“same” for constitutional purposes.
For example, a defendant tried and acquitted (or even convicted) of reckless driving can be tried subsequently for
driving while intoxicated. Blockburger is satisfied because the DWI charge
does not require proof of recklessness and the reckless driving charge does not
require proof of intoxication. This is true even though the two trials may look
and sound very much alike. The determinative issue is what the statutory offenses require, not the facts actually or potentially proved to the jury.
Hence, the proper degree of judicial deference to the legislature’s statutes
in the elements/sentencing factors controversy is not obvious. It is a decision
the Court must make by considering the nature of the constitutional question
and the arguments for and against deference. When defining what constitutes a
“crime” for constitutional purposes, each test must determine and explain the
amount of deference chosen.
3. Statutory “Crimes” and the Sentencing Guidelines. The final issue of
constitutional interpretation important to choosing a constitutional test is
determining how the selected definition of a constitutional “crime” will be
applied not only to criminal statutes defining crimes, but also to statutes
establishing broad sentencing schemes to limit judicial discretion in the
sentencing process. This problem is a significant concern for Justice Breyer:
[For] a couple of hundred years, we have statutes that define crimes, and we have
judges that assert punishment under the statute.
And when they assert punishment, sometimes it’s a little punishment and sometimes a
bigger punishment, and you can look into it scientifically with the aid of [computer]
search[es] and find out what in general bigger or littler turns on, and when we find
that out we find certain factors, like how much drug there was, like whether a person
was hurt, like whether there was a recidivist, and that turns out to be true regardless
of what the judge says.
Now, suddenly, if you decide to write some of that into law, either in the form of . . .
guidelines or statutes, does that suddenly become unconstitutional, the effort to
168. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
169. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
170. See id. at 696-97. Thus, the Court has rejected the “same conduct” approach to double jeopardy, under which the government would have only one chance to prove to a jury the facts of the allegedly criminal conduct. Instead, the government can prosecute repeatedly the same defendant, so long
as each trial proceeds under a statutory offense that is not the “same” as the prior charges—and the
“same offense” determination relies solely on the elements of the offenses required by the text of the
statutes. See id. at 704 (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)).
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regularize what happened in the past by saying explicitly that those factors that did, in
fact, govern punishment in the past now will be presumptively, or sometimes in statutes more than presumptively, grounds for increasing or diminishing a sentence?
What is it about that effort to regularize that should suddenly constitutionalize procedural requirements that were not there when this very same thing went on under the
cloak of darkness because the judge didn’t say what was going on?
....
That’s what in my mind is lying at the heart of this and, of course, my answer in Almendarez-Torres is, except in extreme cases the Constitution does permit Congress
and the [federal Sentencing] Commission to regularize what previously happened silently, or without understanding . . . .
171

That, to be honest, was what my thought was.

Is it possible to distinguish statutes creating new “crimes” from statutes that
regularize sentencing within and across crimes, even where the latter may use
factual determinations to determine the sentence imposed?
An apt analogy may be the relationship between Congress and the Execu172
tive Branch in the modern administrative state. Despite the protests of some
critics, the Court consistently has upheld the validity of administrative rulemaking by executive branch agencies. The reason is that the Court has declined to interpret Article I’s vesting clause, giving Congress “all legislative
173
Powers” of the federal government, as requiring that every rule with the force
of law must emanate from Congress. Executive branch agency rulemaking may
have the force of law, even to the extent of imposing criminal penalties for
violations of regulations. The important distinction the Court has drawn is that
Congress must enact all generative statutes, those that create agencies and give
them their broad powers; so long as the agency is given an “intelligible princi174
ple” to guide its execution of the generative statute, the delegation of rulemaking power is not unconstitutional. If Congress creates an agency, gives it
the power to issue regulations, authorizes criminal sanctions for violations of
those regulations, and constrains the agency’s discretion with some principled
175
guidance, then Article I is satisfied.
The concept of the generative statute may be combined with the Constitution’s distinction between crimes and punishments. “Crimes” always must be
defined by Congress in a generative statute; sentencing factors need not be.
Congress must define precisely the facts and conditions that must be proved to
171. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 976203), available at 1998 WL 713483 (emphasis added).
172. The same theory would also justify state agencies under state constitutional separation of
powers principles.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
174. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
175. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Executive
Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Winter 1998) (arguing that the authority to interpret the
federal criminal statutes should be centralized in the Department of Justice, not dispersed among the
United States Attorneys, and that the subsequent uniform interpretations of the statutes issued by
Main Justice should be accorded the same Chevron deference given to other administrative agencies
by the federal courts).
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constitute the statutory offense. In addition, Congress must state the maximum
and minimum possible sentences for violations of the offense. This constitutes
the generative statute for a “crime.” On the other hand, Congress also may desire to regularize sentencing among judges, both for particular offenses and
across crimes of similar severity. Such regularization and limitation of the discretion of sentencing judges is analogous to nongenerative administrative
176
rulemaking.
The point is a formalistic one: The Sentencing Guidelines do
not create new “crimes” because they are not generative statutes that create new
177
offenses. Instead, even when factfinding is required, all the Guidelines do is
limit discretion when calculating the appropriate sentence for the defendant
under independently ascertainable offenses created by generative criminal
statutes.
Each constitutional “crimes” test (and corollary elements/sentencing factors
rule) either draws the line between generative statutes defining specific crimes
and regulatory statutes harmonizing sentencing generally, or it rejects the distinction outright. That choice will determine, for example, whether the test will
be applied to hold that the Sentencing Guidelines create new “crimes” and
elements, or, instead, that the Guidelines do not establish new crimes but only
178
sentencing factors.
176. This is particularly true where the sentencing regularization is undertaken by an agency outside the legislative branch, as is the case with the federal Sentencing Commission. Even codified
guidelines enacted by the legislature, however, would be logically equivalent so long as they were
broad systems of sentencing regulation.
177. The analogy to the Double Jeopardy Clause is also applicable here. Under the Blockburger
“same elements” test, two offenses may be found not to be the “same offense” even though the crimes
involve the same transaction and identical proof of facts to the jury. See supra Part V.A.2. This is precisely because, under the Blockburger constitutional test, the offenses are considered separate generative statutes and are therefore not the “same.” The converse argument could be applied to the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentence enhancements available under the Guidelines could involve the
same transaction and identical facts proved to the jury as a separate generative aggravating offense—
for example, a simple assault sentence enhanced for brandishing a firearm might overlap with the
available sentence range for assault with a deadly weapon. Precisely because the Sentencing Guidelines are not separate generative statutes, however, the sentence enhancements included in the Guidelines do not create new “crimes.” The double jeopardy analogy demonstrates that the formalistic distinction between generative statutes and nongenerative statutes would not be anamolous to
constitutional criminal procedure.
178. For example, a question of considerable dispute is the required method of proof under the
federal drug offenses. Under the generative statutes, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (1994), crimes involving
different amounts of each drug have different sentences; that is, 10 pounds of marijuana, 10 grams of
crack cocaine, and 10 ounces of LSD will be sentenced disparately. (The companion guidelines, see,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1998), simply carry over these statutory standards, with additional internal elaboration.) Sometimes these sentencing requirements are separately
denoted “penalties” subsections, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), while in other statutes the text relating to offense and punishment is intermingled, making the statute highly ambiguous, see id. § 844. Thus, courts
considering some of these statutes have held that the type and amount of drugs may be determined as
sentencing factors. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1475, 1477 (1998) (“We agree that in
the circumstances of this case [a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846] the judge was
authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the
offense-related activities.”). On the other hand, courts reviewing sentences under some provisions
have held that the distinctions between sentences for type and amount of drugs do create separate offenses, making type and amount an element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d
822 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that third sentence of 21 U.S.C. § 844, regarding punishment for possession of cocaine base, does create a separate offense from the first two sentences, which create the sim-
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B. Analyzing the Proposed Constitutional Tests
Which of the seven proposed tests provides the best constitutional definition of a “crime” for purposes of resolving the elements/sentencing factors
question? A critical analysis of each test reduces the decision to two alternatives.
1. The Pro-Government Position. The pro-government position is a
coherent and viable constitutional test. Under this view, there is no
elements/sentencing factors definition for a “crime” in the Constitution.
Instead, the scope of the text’s references to “crimes” includes only whatever
statutory offenses and elements thereof the legislature chooses to enact. This
position thus provides complete deference to the legislature. Nothing is, as a
matter of constitutional law, ever “necessary” as an element of an offense other
than the facts specified in the operational provisions of generative statutes
179
which expressly create “crimes.”
Furthermore, when the legislature creates
sentencing factors, in external sentencing guidelines or even in generative
statutes, those factors are not elements of a “crime” because the legislature said
180
they are not elements.
If ambiguity about which type of law the legislature
has enacted arises, there is no constitutional issue but only the question of
legislative intent—how did the legislature mean for this fact to be adjudicated?
The pro-government position argues that the only substantive protection
necessary for defendants at sentencing is to ensure that the punishment
imposed is proportional to the offense of conviction.
The pro-government position is the soundest one to adopt if the Court believes that the statutes challenged in recent cases do not in fact present a threat
to constitutional criminal procedure. The position imposes no substantive lim-

ple possession offense for all drugs, and citing cases from other circuits in favor of and contrary to this
construction; the court distinguished Almendarez-Torres on the facts and under the factors analysis
test); see also Brief for Petitioner at 17 n.12, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 976203) (citing cases interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 844).
In the federal drug offenses, the specification and precision for particular amounts and types of
drugs, with different minimum and maximum sentences for each, appears in the generative statutes. If
the constitutional test adopted distinguishes between specific generative statutes and general regularization schemes, the drug offense amounts probably would be held to be distinct “crimes.” Thus, a lessthan-10-pounds and a more-than-10-pounds marijuana possession offense must be separate “crimes”
and not merely sentencing factors. On the other hand, a constitutional test that does not determine a
statute’s constitutionality on the distinction between generative and regulatory statutes would permit
the drug amounts to be proved as sentencing factors even though the sentence differences appear in
the generative statutes. Cf. infra Part V.B.-C. (discussing the maximum sentences position, which
probably would do the former analysis, and the pro-government position, which likely would adopt the
latter).
179. The holding of Mullaney is the entire constitutional rule under the pro-government position:
So long as the prosecution proves as elements of the offense (that is, to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt) the elements specified in the statute, the government has met fully its constitutional burden for
purposes of the elements/sentencing factors issue. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
180. Under the pro-government position, therefore, the type and amount of drugs attributed to the
defendant for purposes of sentencing for a federal drug offense conviction should be, and constitutionally may be, interpreted as sentencing factors. Cf. supra note 178 (discussing the drug offenses).
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its on the provisions of crimes in generative statutes or on the shifting—by generative statutes or sentencing regulations—of factual determinations affecting
the amount of punishment (but not guilt or innocence per se, which must be
proved under trial procedures) into sentencing factors. So long as one is confident that legislatures are not currently abusing their powers to the detriment of
constitutional rights, particularly the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, there is no
reason to think that a rigorous constitutional rule is necessary. The federal and
state governments, of course, can be counted on to argue this position consistently because it best maximizes legislative power. Defendants, similarly, certainly will continue to assert a parade of horribles in an attempt to convince the
181
Court to constrain the anti-defendant incentives in the political process. Ultimately, the Court must decide, on the basis of the cases, records, and briefs
before it, whether it is comfortable concluding that the Constitution defers so
182
greatly to the legislature in matters of criminal procedure.
2. The Procedural Due Process Position. The procedural due process
position is a satisfactory test, but it is not the best constitutional interpretation.
By increasing the amount of process constitutionally due at sentencing
proceedings, defendants’ rights are protected because significant factual
determinations that affect the amount of sentence imposed (beyond
determining the offense of conviction itself, which of course occurs under trial
procedures) must clear more significant procedural hurdles than currently are
183
required. As more and more due process is provided at sentencing, however,
the distinction between trial for a “crime” and imposing punishment at
sentencing begins to break down. Yet this distinction is one created by the
Constitution. So long as sentencing procedures are noticeably less stringent
than trial procedures, the distinction is preserved; if that is true, however, then
the threat to defendants’ rights that began the dispute over the
elements/sentencing factors constitutional question in the first place is reduced
but not eliminated.
In the end, the procedural due process position is little more than an unstable middle ground: Either the constitutional question will not be resolved because sentencing proceedings will continue to be perceived as procedurally inadequate, or the procedural due process position will become indistinguishable
181. After all, an argument in the legislature that elements of offenses are preferable to sentencing
factors, even if based on sincere respect for the Constitution’s procedural protections, is likely to be
portrayed to the public as being “pro-criminal” or “soft on crime.”
182. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484 (1998) (holding that an Iowa statute that authorized arrest
and therefore full automobile searches for all stops, even those to issue traffic citations for speeding—
premised on the Court’s prior holdings that a police officer may search a car upon arresting the driver,
or when he could have arrested the driver but did not—nevertheless violated the Fourth Amendment
because the breadth of situations covered authorized “unreasonable” searches).
183. The procedural due process position feints around the issues of deference and generative/nongenerative statutes. Nominal deference to legislative distinctions between elements and sentencing factors is undercut in practice because increasing sentencing due process substantially moots
the distinction. Similarly, it matters little whether the statute being enforced generates crimes or establishes sentencing regulations, because either kind of system receives rigorous procedural protections.
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from the any-nonmitigating-fact position because every (nonmitigating) fact
used at sentencing will be de facto an element of the “crime” because the procedural requirements at sentencing are essentially the same as those used at
trial. Therefore, while it might serve as a temporary stopgap solution, the procedural due process position ultimately cannot resolve the constitutional issue.
3. The Factors Analysis Position. The factors analysis position is a
necessary but not sufficient constitutional test. Under this position, while the
Constitution, and the Due Process Clause in particular, does not constrain the
legislature’s choice of form, it does limit the law’s substance when certain
constitutional principles are infringed. Thus, for example, the presumption of
innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination may not be undermined,
nor may significant unfairness be imposed on the defendant at sentencing by
excessive punishment differentials or insufficiently rigorous procedures.
Within these limits, however, the position is very deferential to the legislature,
and whether the law is a generative criminal statute or a sentencing regulation
is irrelevant—there is no constitutional violation so long as the final result does
not shock the conscience of the Court in the totality of circumstances.
If the Court intends to hold that the only constitutional violations in the
elements/sentencing factors area are those in which the sentencing tail is wagging the substantive offense dog, the best solution is not to adopt solely the factors analysis test. The Court should adopt the pro-government position and the
factors analysis position together. The pro-government position provides a
clear and easily administered rule for the lower courts: No statute ever violates
the Constitution because of the manner in which it determines elements and
sentencing factors. A constitutional violation occurs only when the consequence of that determination violates collateral constitutional principles—those
described in the factors analysis test. The factors analysis position is a supplement to the pro-government position, a reminder that the Constitution places
some indirect substantive limits on the legislature’s power even when there is
no direct constitutional rule in that area of law. The same analysis applies if the
Court adopts a position other than the pro-government one, because a violation
of the factors analysis test is always unconstitutional, regardless of whether any
other constitutional rule also limits the elements/sentencing factors determination. The factors analysis position solves only a narrow class of constitutional
problems, those at the limits of the legislature’s power; to resolve the cases that
do not push the envelope, the Court must select a test that provides a constitu184
tional answer in all cases.
4. The Maximum Sentences Position. The maximum sentences position is a
sound constitutional test. Under Justice Scalia’s view, a new “crime” is created
when the legislature imposes a binding maximum sentence that cannot be
passed without an additional factual determination. This position generally
184. Cf. infra text following note 199 (reaching a similar conclusion about the historical elements
position).
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provides great deference to the legislature. Most issues are left entirely to
legislative discretion: what criminal offenses will exist, which facts must be
proved to establish guilt for each offense, what the maximum and minimum
sentences will be for those facts, and so on. The only matter about which the
maximum sentences position is not deferential is the definition of the
“maximum sentence” for each crime. When the legislature establishes an
upper limit on the sentence that cannot be passed without additional factual
findings (a “mandatory subsidiary maximum”), it has created a “crime,” and
the facts proved to increase the sentence above that limit are elements of a
185
different, aggravated “crime.”
Except with respect to this constitutional
definition of a “crime,” the maximum sentences position is deferential to the
legislature.
In addition, the maximum sentences position adopts the distinction between
generative statutes and sentencing regulations. The Sentencing Guidelines, for
example, do not define any new “crimes”; although they limit judicial discretion when imposing punishment, the maximum possible sentence is always re186
stricted to that of the underlying statutory offense of conviction.
In other
words, the maximum sentences position’s frame of reference for identifying a
“mandatory subsidiary maximum” is the generative statute creating the offense. A generative statute, even when it is only one section of the criminal
code, defines more than one “crime” every time it establishes a binding sentence maximum. The statutes in Almendarez-Torres, Monge, and Jones each
187
did exactly that. Similarly, nongenerative statutes or regulations limiting the
discretion of the sentencing judge by regularizing sentencing procedures and
factfinding do not define new “crimes” (because they are not generative stat188
utes).
The maximum sentences position provides a constitutional definition
of “crime” that is generally deferential to the substance of the criminal law and
to the regulation of sentencing procedure.
5. The Any-Nonmitigating-Fact Position. The any-nonmitigating-fact
position is perhaps the clearest of the various constitutional tests, but the
legislative choice it compels is not consistent with the Constitution’s basic
distinction between trial and punishment. Under the any-nonmitigating-fact
position, every factual determination that does not play a mitigating role for
185. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 111. Other effects, such as mandatory minimums, which operate underneath
the maximum, merely determine the sentence imposed for the offense and also do not create new
“crimes”—the scope of a “crime” defined by its maximum possible sentence.
187. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I believe that for
federal constitutional purposes those extra four years are attributable to conviction of a new crime.”);
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1244 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I would find
that § 1326(b)(2) establishes a separate offense . . . .”); see also supra notes 108-110 and accompanying
text.
188. In the federal drug laws, the binding maximum sentence levels based on precise quantities of
various drugs do appear in the generative statutes. Therefore, Justice Scalia would likely conclude that
these statutes stated multiple “crimes,” and thus that drug type and amount are elements of those offenses. Cf. supra note 178 (discussing the federal drug offenses).
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the defendant must be an element of the offense—it is “necessary to constitute
the crime” as a matter of constitutional, not simply statutory, construction. In
other words, all nonmitigating facts must be parts of “crimes”; they cannot be
used at only the punishment stage. This position thus flatly rejects the
dichotomy between generative criminal statutes and nongenerative sentencing
regulations: No matter how the legislature labels it, a nonmitigating fact must
be proved as an element. This is a tenable definition for a “crime”: Any facts
used to define prohibited (that is, nonmitigating) conduct are parts of crimes;
sentencing is only a formality of punishment imposition, not a time for
additional nonmitigating facts to be considered.
This definition of a “crime,” however, compels the legislature to adopt
some form of a determinate sentencing system because no additional nonmitigating facts may be considered after the trial. The consequence is to give the
legislature two choices. In one, the legislature could abandon individualized
sentencing—all defendants convicted of each crime (robbery, murder, petty
theft, and so on) would receive the same sentence regardless of the facts of
their cases. In the other, the legislature could retain individualized sentencing
by enacting a highly detailed and extremely micromanaged criminal code—the
prosecutor would select precisely the elements to meet the defendant’s conduct
(such as assault, assault with intent to injure, assault while possessing a gun, assault with intent to injure while possessing a gun, ad infinitum). Under such a
finely tuned criminal code, each different assortment of facts has a determinate
punishment, so individualized punishment is achieved not in a factfinding sentencing proceeding but in the selection of facts revealed by the prosecution’s
charge(s) and the jury’s conviction(s). Thus, the any-nonmitigating-fact position is not at all deferential to the legislature.
The any-nonmitigating-fact position should not be adopted—despite its intellectual clarity—because it will produce results inconsistent with longaccepted constitutional principles. First, its definition of a “crime” does not fit
the Constitution’s distinction between trial and punishment. Although the
Constitution permits determinate sentencing, our constitutional history and
practice also demonstrate that judges always have exercised discretion to con189
sider additional facts not proved at trial during a sentencing proceeding. The
Constitution has never been interpreted to require determinate sentencing,
which is the conclusion the any-nonmitigating-fact position compels. Second,
while the any-nonmitigating-fact position is the most protective of defendants’
rights by extending full criminal procedural protections to all nonmitigating
factual determinations, the Constitution cannot fairly be read to command that
outcome. This is a battle already fought and lost; not every fact that might be
important to the defendant’s sentence must be an element. The simplest example is also the most visceral: The Constitution does not require that even the
aggravating factors proved by the government as justifications for imposing the
death penalty—surely the most nonmitigating factual determinations of all—
189. See, e.g., supra notes 7-19, 171, and accompanying text.

PRIESTERNOTE.FMT.DOC

286

05/18/99 3:41 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 4

190

must be proved as elements under full trial procedures.
Although the anynonmitigating-fact position is simple to understand and administer, adopting it
would require a radical break with the Court’s contemporary constitutional interpretation not only in this area, but in other, more well-developed fields of
jurisprudence.
6. The Historical Elements Position. The Court and many Justices have
acknowledged, often in dicta, that it is troublesome when the legislature
rewrites its statutes to ease the government’s burden of proof by altering the
elements of traditional offenses. For example, Maine in Mullaney and New
York in Patterson in effect were tinkering with the well-established mens rea
191
elements of murder and manslaughter.
Yet the legislature should not be
allowed to avoid Winship by redefining the traditional elements of long192
established crimes. In light of the constitutional text, however, this concern is
not really part of the elements/sentencing factors issue. The problem is not that
the state is easing the government’s burden by shifting a traditional element
into a sentencing factor; the problem is that the state is altering the elements of
a “crime” it no longer has the right to redefine. In other words, the argument is
that continuous practice and understanding have constitutionalized the status
of certain “crimes” or portions thereof, be they the standard state common law
crimes (such as murder and manslaughter, or burglary, or arson) or codified
state or federal offenses. To remove the mens rea gradations from homicide is
to alter a “crime” that the people (through the constitutional decisions of the
Supreme Court) view as so long established that its definition is immune from
legislative abrogation.
Under the historical elements position, the issue is not whether the disputed
facts are elements or sentencing factors, but whether a specific offense is itself
directly included in the constitutional “crime” category; its elements are constitutionally required elements not because of a test or definition of the Constitution’s “crime,” but because the offense is a constitutional “crime.” This consti193
194
tutional “gloss” or “long-continued practice” limits the legislature’s power
to redefine its criminal code. That some crimes may be constitutionalized in
whole or in part does not affect the choice of the constitutional definition for
elements/sentencing factors purposes, because the two issues are based on dif-

190. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990) (holding that the findings of fact supporting the imposition of a capital sentence need not be made by a jury); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that capital sentence aggravating factors are not elements of
the offense which require jury determination, but may be determined through factfinding by the judge
alone).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 21-41.
192. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698-99 (1975); id. at 706 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Brief for the United States at 48,
Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 97-6203).
193. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
194. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469, 474 (1915).
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ferent theories of what type of “crime” (specific offenses or general legislative
power, respectively) is involved.
In addition, the historical elements position has very limited applicability.
The instances of crimes or elements of crimes that are so embedded that they
can no longer be revised are few and far between. Only the most obvious cases
(such as homicide mens rea) will be easily resolved by the historical elements
position. For almost every contemporary criminal offense, whether a given
type of factual determination is a traditional element of an “historical” crime is
rarely, if ever, clear—and in almost every case it probably is not. For example,
Justice Powell argued that allowing affirmative defenses for an unloaded or inoperative gun, or for a reasonable belief about a statutory rape victim’s age, or
for corporate due diligence do not undermine the constitutional criminal procedure protections because these “new” affirmative defenses do not eliminate
elements of traditional crimes in the way, for example, the New York homicide
195
Similarly, in Almendarez-Torres, the
mens rea provision in Patterson did.
Court argued that “recidivism[] is a traditional, if not the most traditional”
196
nonjury-triable sentencing factor; the dissent insisted that while the Court’s
decisions do show that recidivism sentencing enhancements do not constitute a
second punishment for the first offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
decisions have “not allowed recidivism to be determined by a judge as more
197
likely than not.” Likewise, the Jones briefs could not disagree more strongly
about historical practice: Serious bodily injury “is the type of fact that has historically been determined, and is best determined, by a jury beyond a reason198
able doubt,” but “the question of victim harm . . . is ‘as typical a sentencing
199
factor as one might imagine.’”
In the end, the historical elements position serves as an outer limit on legislative power, but it does not resolve the core elements/sentencing factors
question in dispute. With the exception of a few easily recognizable situations,
almost every law the legislature enacts will not violate this rule. The historical
elements position makes a new Mullaney case easy to decide. It does not help,
however, to determine the outcome in Almendarez-Torres, Monge, or Jones;
most criminal offenses lack a deeply embedded history and practice that could
create an historical elements position violation. A few crimes may become so
well established that they cannot be altered; for these crimes, the historical
elements position defines “crime” in a way that resolves the case. As with the
factors analysis position, the historical elements position serves as a reminder
that the Court should not be deferential when the legislature exceeds its appropriate powers in defining criminal offenses and their elements and sentencing
factors. The Constitution’s “crime” cannot be defined only by the historical
195. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 229-30 & n.14 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
196. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230 (1998).
197. Id. at 1238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 97-6203).
199. Brief for the United States at 23, Jones (No. 97-6203) (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct.
at 1224).
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elements position, however, because the position applies to a much narrower
constitutional issue. To resolve the broader elements/sentencing factors constitutional question, the historical elements position must be supplemented by
another theory, such as the pro-government or maximum sentences position.
Thus, the historical elements position is a necessary but not sufficient part of
the definition of a constitutional “crime.”
7. The Facts-of-the-Offense Position. The facts-of-the-offense position is
initially attractive, but it suffers from theoretical difficulties that preclude its
adoption as the constitutional test. The distinction between facts related to the
offense and facts related to the offender is an intuitive one. The distinction is
also sensible in terms of the constitutional text: Facts relating to the
circumstances of the present commission of a “crime” are different from facts
relating solely to the character or past behavior of the person who allegedly
committed that “crime.” The structure of the facts-of-the-offense position is
easy to understand and apply.
Unfortunately, the position has two theoretical flaws. First, it conflicts with
established constitutional principles. The facts-of-the-offense position is comparable to the any-nonmitigating-fact position in all respects except that the
facts-of-the-offense position does not require element status for offenderrelated nonmitigating factual determinations. In other words, the petitioner in
Jones adopted Justice Stevens’s position, modified to accommodate the holding
of Almendarez-Torres that the offender-related fact of recidivism may be a sentencing factor. The facts-of-the-offense position still asserts that other, offenserelated nonmitigating factual determinations must be proved as elements. This
assertion, therefore, suffers from the same defects as the any-nonmitigatingfact position: It compels determinate sentencing contrary to accepted doctrine,
and it follows a rule more protective of defendants than the Court has ever re200
quired.
The second theoretical flaw is that, although the distinction between offense- and offender-related facts is intuitive, there is no sound theoretical reason for making the distinction as a matter of constitutional law. Why should all
facts of the offense be proved as elements, but not facts relating to the offender? The Monge majority suggested the risk of prejudice to the defendant
201
202
as one explanation.
Some facts—like recidivism in Almendarez-Torres —
may be so prejudicial that “fairness calls for defining [that] fact as a sentencing
factor. A defendant might not, for example, wish to simultaneously profess his
innocence of a drug offense and dispute the amount of drugs allegedly in203
volved.”
But as the Monge Court’s own example shows, it is not only offender characteristics that may be highly prejudicial. Furthermore, Justice
Scalia’s Monge dissent persuasively insists that it would never be necessary to
200.
201.
202.
203.

See supra Part V.B.5.
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 404 (generally excluding offender-related character evidence).
See Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct. at 1226.
Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2250 (1998).
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exclude any fact from jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirements: “Even if I agreed that putting a defendant to such a choice would be
fundamentally unfair . . . , for example, when one of the elements involves the
defendant’s prior criminal history[], the trial can be bifurcated without sacri204
ficing jury factfinding in the second phase.” Thus, the risk of prejudice is not
a satisfactory reason for separating out offender facts—bifurcating the trial preserves element status while ensuring that the prejudicial element does not color
factfinding on any other element. Another possible reason for distinguishing
between offense and offender facts, if it is provable, would be a traditional
practice of treating offender characteristics this way. Again, however, the opportunity for bifurcation at trial undermines the persuasiveness of such a practice. Therefore, while the facts-of-the-offense position draws an attractive distinction, there is no sound theoretical explanation to justify the adoption of that
distinction as a constitutional rule. Unless such a reason is developed, the
facts-of-the-offense position should be rejected by the Court.
8. Conclusions from the Proposed Constitutional Tests. Only two of the
proposed constitutional tests provide workable, complete definitions of the
Constitution’s “crime” language. The pro-government position is highly
deferential to the legislature, and places no significant constitutional limitations
on which facts may be elements or sentencing factors. The maximum sentences
position is also deferential, limiting the legislature only to the extent that the
position imposes a constitutional definition of “crime” linked to the factual
findings needed to impose binding maximum sentences.
The other proposed tests are not suitable for use as the Court’s constitutional test for the elements/sentencing factors question. The procedural due
process position might temporarily mute the issue, but cannot solve the theoretical conflict in the long term. The any-nonmitigating-fact position is powerful, but it would require too great a break with traditional practice and contemporary constitutional principles. The facts-of-the-offense position suffers from
similar flaws while facing the additional problem that it lacks a sound theoretical reason for making the distinction it draws. Finally, the factors analysis and
historical elements positions have merit, but each is by itself insufficient as a
constitutional test. The factors analysis test elaborates the outer limits that the
Constitution and Due Process Clause place on the legislature’s power, while
the historical elements position explains why certain traditional crimes or elements may not be altered by the legislature. These two narrow, collateral limitations will remain in effect whether the pro-government or maximum sentences position is adopted.
In selecting the constitutional test, the Court should choose between the
pro-government position and the maximum sentences position, while preserving the restrictions of the factors analysis position and historical elements position in extreme cases.
204. Id. at 2255 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C. The Decision: Choosing the Constitutional Test
The choice between the pro-government position and the maximum sentences position is not an obvious one. The decision must be based on which test
provides the better definition of “crime” in the Constitution and the more convincing accommodation of the constitutional interests at stake: judicial deference to the legislature and the constitutional protections in criminal procedure.
In many respects, the two positions are quite similar. Both the progovernment position and the maximum sentences position accept the distinction between generative criminal laws and sentencing schemes. Under either
test, if the legislature merely seeks to limit sentencing discretion generally, by a
regularization statute or regulations akin to the federal Sentencing Guidelines,
then those nongenerative rules may be sentencing factors even when they in205
volve factfinding. Similarly, both positions agree with the holding in McMillan that the imposition of a mandatory minimum does not require proof as an
element.
The positions diverge, however, on the facts of the most recent cases. For
example, the Monge Court concluded that the maximum possible increased
sentence available after the application of California’s recidivism enhancement
(fourteen years) was constitutionally proportional to the sentence otherwise
available (seven years) for the offense of which Monge was convicted, using a
206
minor to sell drugs. Justice Scalia’s dissent, by contrast, insisted that because
Monge’s sentence of eleven years exceeded the seven-year maximum in the
drug-selling statute, Monge had been sentenced for an aggravated crime of
which he had not been convicted; the recidivism allegation had not been proven
207
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similarly, the two positions disagree about the proper disposition of Jones.
The pro-government position would find no constitutional difficulty in the sentence imposed on Jones: The serious bodily injury sentence enhancement may
205. Under the pro-government position, sentencing factors created in generative statutes also are
constitutional. Under the maximum sentences position, by contrast, factfinding tied to the defendant’s
maximum possible sentence in the generative statute must be made as elements of the offense. Cf.
Edwards v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1475 (1998). Justice Breyer, for the Court, argued the following:
Of course, petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were
possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed [under the Guidelines] exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. . . . But, as the Government
points out, the sentences imposed here were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed to each petitioner.
Id. at 1477-78 (emphasis added). So long as the final sentence imposed is no greater than the maximum provided for the “crime” in the generative statute, the use of nongenerative sentencing factors is
constitutional. See id. at 1477 (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam)
(upholding consideration under the Guidelines of conduct for which the defendant was acquitted);
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (holding that uncharged conduct may be considered when
calculating sentence under the Guidelines)).
206. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251 (“That increase falls well within the range that the Court has
found to be constitutionally permissible. See Almendarez-Torres . . . (upholding a potential 18-year
increase to a 2-year sentence).”) (citation omitted).
207. See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I believe that for federal constitutional purposes those
extra four years are attributable to conviction of a new crime.”); cf. infra note 212 (discussing sentence
enhancement provisions).
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be permissibly determined as a sentencing factor. The maximum sentences position, by contrast, would reverse Jones’s sentence. The carjacking statute does
not permit a sentence in excess of fifteen years without proof that serious bodily injury or a death resulted, so such a provision is a generative statute maxi208
mum sentence. Jones was sentenced, however, to twenty-five years, but the
allegation of serious bodily injury was not proved as an element of the offense.
Therefore, the length of Jones’s sentence violates the Constitution under the
maximum sentences position. It is for Jones and cases with similar divergences
between the pro-government position and the maximum sentences position
that the choice of the constitutional test is important.
In the final analysis, the maximum sentences position is the superior constitutional interpretation because it provides the better definition of a constitutional “crime.” As with the pro-government position, the legislature retains the
power to determine the facts that must be proved to declare guilt and the
power to establish the maximum sentence to be imposed on the convicted defendant based on those facts. When, however, the legislature limits the maximum sentence for specific facts in the generative statute, each such mandatory
subsidiary maximum is a new “crime” under the maximum sentences position,
and the factual determination that bumps one up to the other is thus an element of the more severe crime.
By contrast, the pro-government position imposes no definition of “crime”
at all—the elements of an offense are only what the legislature says they are. A
defendant can complain that the government failed to prove the “crime” of
conviction only in the unusual case that the prosecutor somehow failed to read
the statute properly. This definition of “crime” is overly deferential to the legislature, given that interests of a constitutional magnitude (the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments) are at stake. Even under the deferential Blockburger double
jeopardy doctrine, for example, there is some constitutional limitation: Two
crimes can be the “same offense”—even if the legislature enacts and codifies
them separately—if each does not contain an element not required by the
209
other. Yet the pro-government position asserts that the Constitution says absolutely nothing about how to define a “crime” in resolving the elements/sentencing factors question.
The pro-government position’s definition of “crime” is not as persuasive as
that provided by the maximum sentences position. The Fifth and Sixth
Amendments provide strong procedural protections for defendants on trial for
a “crime.” If “crime” has no meaning other than that given it by the legislature, however, the constitutional magnitude of these protections is destroyed.
The maximum sentences position imbues the Constitution’s “crime” language
with meaning, and thereby imposes some limits on the legislature’s ability to
210
evade constitutional protections.
As in double jeopardy, the constitutional
208. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 168-170, 177, and accompanying text.
210. This difference between the pro-government and maximum sentences positions is illustrated
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by reconsidering the hypothetical statute posed by Justice Scalia (quoted at the beginning of this note),
under which the only criminal offense is knowingly causing injury to another, punishable by up to 30
days imprisonment, but accompanied by a detailed system of sentence enhancements. See supra text
accompanying note 3. Under the pro-government position, this statute passes constitutional muster so
long as the sentence imposed is proportional and does not otherwise violate the Constitution (that is,
there is no violation of the factors analysis position, the historical elements positions, or of collateral
principles such as unconstitutional vagueness or the Ex Post Facto Clause). The defendant’s offense of
conviction could be the 30-days knowingly-causing-injury offense, but his sentence could be twentyfive years because he used a firearm, caused serious bodily injury, and the victim was a police officer.
Under the maximum sentences position, however, no sentence may be imposed under this statute
in excess of 30 days, no matter how egregious the facts. Facts used to impose a greater sentence must
be proved as elements of the offense. This conclusion, however, reveals what could be seen as a weakness in the maximum sentences position. Suppose the legislature had instead provided that knowingly
causing injury to another shall be punishable by up to life imprisonment, with a detailed set of sentencing guidelines for judges to follow when determining the defendant’s sentence in the zero-to-life
range, premised on a nongenerative “base offense” sentence of 30 days. This statute would not violate
the maximum sentences position: The generative statute provides a maximum of life imprisonment for
the crime’s facts. The nongenerative sentencing regulations may increase or decrease the defendant’s
sentence from the 30-days baseline without violating the Constitution, for all sentences up to and including the single maximum in the generative statute—life imprisonment.
Thus, the maximum sentences position does not limit the power of the legislature to evade constitutional criminal procedure protections by providing for draconian sentences for simple offenses. If
Congress is willing to enact a law providing for—in the generative statute—life imprisonment for damage to property, cf. supra notes 82-83 (discussing the religious property defacement statute), and to
rely on the nongenerative Sentencing Guidelines to ensure that graffiti is not punished as severely as
arson, then the maximum sentences position does not prohibit such an outcome.
This result is not necessarily troublesome because of the elements/sentencing factors issue, however. In some respects, the elements/sentencing factors issue is locked in a chicken-and-egg dilemma
with the severe punishments currently in favor in most legislatures. For example, suppose—under the
life-imprisonment-maximum generative statute, which satisfies the maximum sentences position—a
property damage crime caused serious bodily injury to a victim, and the defendant was accordingly
sentenced to twenty years in prison under the Sentencing Guidelines. If one finds this result troubling,
is it because the victim injury facts were not proved to the jury, or because the sentence is twenty years
when the offense of conviction is “throwing a bucket of paint on a wall”? Transcript of Oral Argument
at 30, Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (No. 97-6203), available at 1998 WL 713483. The
answer is probably the latter. Similarly, are criticisms of the drug laws’ punishments mainly focused on
the argument that drug amounts should be proved to the jury, or that being sentenced to 5 to 40 years
in prison—on the first offense—for five grams of crack cocaine or one gram of LSD, see 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B) (1994), is simply too harsh? See, e.g., Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders:
The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1995) (criticizing the severity of penalties for federal drug offenses). The latter concern is often the dominant one. If that is the case, then using the
maximum sentences position is still a sound answer to the elements/sentencing factors constitutional
question. The position functions as an intellectually comfortable definition of a “crime” so long as the
maximum sentences available in the generative statutes are reasonably related to the severity of those
offenses.
Arguments that legislatures are out of control, and that the available maximum sentences for
crimes need to be reined in, are not best resolved by requiring constitutionally that the facts justifying
those outrageously high maxima to be proved to the jury. The legislatures will simply rewrite the laws
to meet that requirement, and the problem of sentence severity will not be solved. Instead, the attack
must focus on the heart of the matter, the lack of reasonable proportionality between the severity of
crimes and the sentences imposed. That issue, however, does not affect the elements/sentencing factors question, but should be resolved by political pressure or other constitutional principles (such as a
more rigorous Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine), not by expanding the range of facts
proved as elements of the offense.
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test does not micromanage the criminal code, but it does not put defendants’
rights at the will and whim of the legislature’s labels.
The maximum sentences position also provides a better explanation of the
constitutional interests at stake when defining “crime” in the elements/sentencing factors context. The defendant’s most important interest,
Justice Scalia argues, is understanding the government’s accusation in terms of
the maximum possible sentence to which the defendant is exposed. The facts
the government must prove as elements are those that determine the maximum
sentence; sentence enhancement provisions cannot increase the sentence above
212
this maximum without also being proved as elements of the offense. Any fact
that determines the sentence within that maximum—be it an enhancement
above an intermediary nongenerative baseline (as in the federal Sentencing
Guidelines), or a mandatory minimum, or so on—may permissibly be proved as
a sentencing factor. The legislature is required to designate as elements of the
offense in the generative statute only those facts that will determine the maximum possible sentence, while intermediate determinations may be sentencing
factors. The defendant receives the Constitution’s procedural protections for
criminal trials on all facts that determine his “crime”—that is, his maximum
possible exposure to deprivation of life, liberty, or property—but not on facts
that calculate the appropriate level of sentence within that range.
The maximum sentences position will not be satisfactory to all critics. Under this position, there are still many very significant sentencing determinations
made only by a judge and without the rigorous procedural protections of the
213
Constitution (or even the Rules of Evidence ), such as mandatory minimums
211. Cf. supra notes 169 and accompanying text & 177 (noting that the Court has rejected a “same
conduct” test in double jeopardy, and arguing that the Court should similarly reject a conduct- or anyfacts-based test in this area).
212. Sentence enhancement provisions may appear in nongenerative statutes (such as the provision
in Monge, which created a sentence enhancement for recidivism available for application to offenders
convicted of many different generative statute crimes), or within a single section of a generative statute (such as the provisions applied in Almendarez-Torres and Jones, which were specific to the offenses of conviction in those cases). Under the maximum sentences position, neither type of sentence
enhancement can increase the sentence above the maximum—including a mandatory subsidiary
maximum—in the generative statute creating the offense of conviction. If, however, the facts underlying the sentence enhancement are proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, then a conviction
for an additional “crime” has taken place. In essence, an additional offense of conviction is entered,
and the constitutionally permissible maximum sentence would include the provisions of both the sentence enhancement and the original offense.
A prominent situation in which this rule has important consequences is the application of hate
crime legislation. For example, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), the Court unanimously
held that a sentence enhancement provision that increased the defendant’s sentence because he intentionally selected his victim because of race did not violate the First Amendment. No mention of the
elements/sentencing factors constitutional question appeared in the opinion. In fact, however, the defendant had been convicted by the jury only of aggravated battery, which carried a maximum sentence
of two years; the enhanced sentence imposed was four years. See id. at 480-81. Under the maximum
sentences position, that enhancement was not constitutionally proper—because the facts proved to the
jury only permitted a maximum sentence of two years under the aggravated battery conviction—unless
the enhancement’s underlying facts (that is, the intentional racial selection of the victim) were also
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
213. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1998) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant
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or aggravating factors within the statutory range. This situation poses grave
risks to defendants. Perhaps it would be sound criminal procedure policy to afford defendants more rights in sentencing than they currently are provided.
Adopting the maximum sentences position does not foreclose such developments. Rather, it merely means that, as a constitutional matter, the government
has met its burden so long as the factual determinations of guilt or innocence
and the maximum possible sentence are made under the elements-of-theoffense procedures. Such a conclusion is not an odd result: The Constitution,
after all, declares only the minimum standards to which the people hold the
government; it is often a good idea to do much more. The maximum sentences
position should be adopted as the solution to the elements/sentencing factors
question because it provides the best interpretation of the constitutional issue.
VI
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Supreme Court decided Jones v. United States on March 24, 1999,
shortly before this note went to press and five and a half months after oral argument.214 The Court reversed and remanded in a 5-4 decision215 without
reaching a disposition on the merits of the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question—the holding of the case is limited to the interpretation of the
carjacking statute alone.216 The opinions also reveal, however, that the Court
may be close to resolving the constitutional issue.
The Jones majority opinion held that the carjacking statute itself creates
“three distinct offenses.”217 The Court argued that this was the proper reading
as a matter of statutory interpretation. The opinion reviewed the statute’s
structure and unclear grammar, the elements of state robbery statutes and of
the federal robbery statutes that were the models for the carjacking offense,
and the ambiguous legislative history.218 Serious bodily injury, the Court concluded, was intended by Congress to be an element of the offense of an aggravated carjacking crime within 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Jones’s appeal thus succeeded:
The Court agreed that he could not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
greater than fifteen years unless the government proved the serious bodily injury allegation to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.219

information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided
that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”).
214. See 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999).
215. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and
Breyer.
216. See 119 S. Ct. at 1217.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 1219-22.
219. See id. at 1228 (“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
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The majority opinion, however, further justified its statutory interpretation
with an extensive discussion of the “constitutional doubt” that would arise were
the serious bodily injury fact treated only as a sentencing factor.220 The Court
examined Mullaney, Patterson, and McMillan,221 distinguished Almendarez222
Torres and the capital sentencing cases, and discussed the historical power of
juries to determine not only the facts but also the defendant’s ultimate fate.223
This analysis led the majority to conclude that if the sentencing gradations in
the carjacking offense were only sentencing factors, there would be grave
doubts about the statute’s constitutionality because it would violate the maximum sentences position.224 Despite the support of a majority of the Court for
the maximum sentences position, however, the Jones majority opinion did not
adopt directly the maximum sentences position as the constitutional rule; instead, the discussion was restricted to the doctrine of constitutional doubt.
The Jones dissenters rejected both parts of the majority opinion. First, the
dissent argued that the carjacking statute defined only one offense, with proof
of serious bodily injury made as a sentencing factor.225 Second, the dissenters
insisted that interpreting serious bodily injury as a sentencing factor did not call
into question the statute’s constitutionality: “[T]he Court’s constitutional
doubts are not well founded.”226 Relying on its interpretation of Almendarez227
Torres, the dissent insisted that the constitutional question was closed.
In one respect, therefore, the Jones decision made no headway in resolving
the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question—a majority of the
Court has yet to pass definitively on the issue. From another perspective, Jones
may be a turning point: It marked the first case since Mullaney in which the
Court rejected on constitutional grounds the government’s argument on the
elements/sentencing factors issue, albeit only in the form of constitutional
doubt, not a constitutional holding. Whether Jones ultimately will be described
as a landmark decision, however, remains unclear. Four Justices repeatedly
have rejected the adoption of a constitutional test, and, if forced to decide the
constitutional question, presumably would favor the pro-government posi-

220. See id. at 1217, 1222-1228.
221. See id. at 1222-24.
222. See id. at 1226-27 & n.10 (distinguishing Almendarez-Torres because its holding was limited to
the narrow issue of proof of recidivism); id. at 1227-28 (arguing that the capital sentencing cases
“characterized the finding of aggravating facts falling within the traditional scope of capital sentencing
as a choice between a greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the ceiling of the sentencing range available.”).
223. See id. at 1224-26. “The point is simply that diminishment of the jury’s significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.” Id. at 1226.
224. See id. at 1222, 1224 & n.6, 1228 n.11.
225. See id. at 1230-34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 1236 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In effect, therefore, the dissent called for the adoption of
the pro-government position as the constitutional rule.
227. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also suggested that the maximum sentences position can be evaded by legislative drafting, see id. at 1235-36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), an argument refuted in this note, see supra Part III.B.2.
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tion.228 On the other hand, two Justices expressly have committed to the maximum sentences position as a constitutional rule,229 and two Justices implicitly
have done so.230 Justice Thomas, without separate comment, determined the
result in Jones. Perhaps he has not settled his views on the elements/sentencing
factors constitutional question,231 although the Jones majority opinion included
several clues that suggest otherwise.232 It seems likely that Justice Thomas—or
228. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Breyer each joined the dissent
in Jones as well as the majority opinions in Almendarez-Torrez and Monge.
229. In Jones, Justice Scalia reaffirmed his commitment to the maximum sentences position as a
constitutional requirement, see 119 S. Ct. at 1229 (Scalia, J., concurring), while Justice Stevens remains
willing to go even further, see id. at 1228-29(Stevens, J., concurring).
230. Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined without separate comment Justice Scalia’s dissents in Almendarez-Torres (asserting constitutional doubt) and Monge (asserting constitutional violation), and
voted with the majority in Jones (asserting constitutional doubt).
231. Without separate comment, Justice Thomas joined the majority opinions in AlmendarezTorres and Monge, each of which directly confronted and rejected the constitutional arguments of Justice Scalia’s dissents in those cases. In Jones, however, Justice Thomas joined—again without separate
comment—the majority opinion by Justice Souter, which in part expressly relied on the same constitutional doubt arguments previously expressed in Justice Scalia’s dissents.
232. If Justice Thomas’s vote in Jones truly depended on only the statutory interpretation arguments, he easily could have joined Part II but not Part III of Justice Souter’s majority opinion; such a
vote would have preserved the outcome without supporting the constitutional doubt reasoning. In
fact, it would have been possible for Justice Thomas to join Part II of Justice Kennedy’s dissent (which
reasserted the constitutional position Justice Thomas had joined in Almendarez-Torres and Monge)
but also to join Part II of Justice Souter’s majority opinion, thereby forming a five-Justice majority for
the pro-government position on the constitutional issue but holding that the carjacking statute itself
established serious bodily injury as an element of the offense. Justice Thomas’s actual vote in Jones,
however, did neither of these—he joined both the statutory and constitutional analyses of the majority.
Several statements in the Jones majority opinion may provide insight on Justice Thomas’s decision.
First, the majority repeatedly asserted that Jones is not controlled by Almendarez-Torres. See 119 S.
Ct. at 1219 (“Because of features arguably distinguishing this case from Almendarez-Torres . . . we
granted certiorari . . . .”); see also id. at 1220. In particular, the Court emphasized that the holding in
Almendarez-Torres depended upon, and was limited by, the fact that recidivism, and not some other
type of factual finding, was used to increase the maximum possible sentence in that case. See id. at
1226-27 & n.10. This distinction was also apparent in the majority’s formulation of the maximum sentences position: “[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 1224 n.6 (emphasis added). The majority suggested one reason recidivism was distinguishable:
“[U]nlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior conviction must itself have been established” under elements of the offense procedures; that is, the recidivist defendant already has received the full
constitutional procedural protections on those facts, and therefore does not need to be given those protections a second time before recidivism is used to increase the maximum possible sentence. Id. at
1227. This argument, if accepted, eliminates any inconsistency between the holding of Jones and the
holdings of Almendarez-Torres and Monge.
A second argument repeated by the majority is that the maximum sentences position, even if
adopted as a constitutional rule, would not interfere with legislative power. The Court noted that the
maximum sentences position only limits the procedures used to determine the defendant’s maximum
sentence; it does not limit the substance of what facts the legislature may declare to be relevant in calculating sentence. See id. at 1224 n.6, 1228 n.11. Thus, the Court concluded that the maximum sentences position is sufficiently deferential to the legislature: The rule “would in no way hinder the
States (or the National Government) from choosing to pursue policies aimed at rationalizing sentencing practices.” Id. at 1228 n.11.
Third and finally, the majority opinion included a lengthy historical explanation of the right to jury
trial and the practice of jury nullification. See id. at 1224-26. This discussion concluded by arguing that
preserving the Sixth Amendment’s original principles might require the maximum sentences position
as a constitutional rule. See id. at 1226.
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perhaps the next Justice elevated to the Court—will control the outcome of future cases on this issue.
Despite the opportunity to do so, the Court did not resolve the elements/sentencing factors constitutional question in Jones. Rather than face an
endless stream of certiorari petitions from defendants citing the Jones constitutional doubt analysis to support their claims that their statutes of conviction
also require a similar interpretation, the Court should hold definitively—and as
soon as possible—that the maximum sentences position does not merely raise
doubts, but is a constitutional rule.
VII
CONCLUSION
The elements/sentencing factors constitutional problem is not an easy one
to resolve. Does the Constitution entirely defer to the legislature on the determination of which facts are “necessary to constitute” a crime and therefore
must be proved as elements of the offense (that is, with the full constitutional
criminal procedure protections of jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt), and which facts merely relate to the “severity of punishment” and may
be proved as sentencing factors? The pro-government position provides a
strong argument for such deference. The better constitutional interpretation,
however, is the maximum sentences position. This position defines a “crime”
for elements/sentencing factors constitutional purposes as those facts necessary
to establish the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed under
the generative criminal statute for which the jury convicted him at trial. In the
generative statute, the legislature must specify those facts and must set the
binding maximum sentence for the facts chosen. The legislature is also free to
provide sentencing judges with no discretion, complete discretion, or some discretion when determining the appropriate sentence for each convicted defendant. Factfinding that results in a sentence within the maximum established in
the offense’s generative statute may be done at sentencing—that is, by use of
sentencing factors. Factfinding that leads to a sentence above the maximum in
the generative statute, however, is factfinding about a different “crime” and
therefore the determinative facts differentiating the two “crimes” must be

Any or all of these arguments, or an argument not revealed in the Jones majority opinion, may
have persuaded Justice Thomas to join the Court’s constitutional doubt analysis. The Court’s opinions,
furthermore, provided no explanation for why the opinion of the five-Justice majority in Jones was
limited to the constitutional doubt analysis. The constitutional question was raised by a question presented, and was fully briefed and argued. The Court could have adopted the maximum sentences position outright as the constitutional rule, but did not do so. Perhaps Justice Thomas still harbors genuine
doubts about the constitutional question. Perhaps Justice Scalia, following the posture of his Almendarez-Torres dissent, insisted that the majority—although the votes for adopting the constitutional rule
were present—not reach a constitutional decision not required by the facts of the case (as would have
been the case in Monge, but was not in Jones). For an unexplained reason, the majority limited its
analysis to constitutional doubt rather than handing down a holding with the maximum sentences position as the constitutional rule.
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proved as elements of the offense at trial under the Constitution’s full criminal
procedure protections.
The maximum sentences position does not fully eliminate the criticism that
defendants may have very important determinations about their fate (for example, enhancements for uncharged conduct, mandatory minimums, and so on)
made only at sentencing and not at trial. The Constitution, however, has never
been interpreted to require that every fact affecting a criminal sentence must
be proved at trial. At the same time, if there is no constitutional definition of a
“crime” at all, then the stringent criminal trial procedural protections can be
evaded easily by leaving factfinding of any importance to the sentencing proceeding. The maximum sentences position, therefore, provides the best definition of a constitutional “crime”: The Constitution requires that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury those facts that will determine
the maximum sentence the defendant faces. This maximum is the “crime” for
which the defendant is convicted at trial. When sentence is imposed through
whatever sentencing factors or guidelines the legislature has chosen to provide,
the defendant cannot claim that he has been sentenced for a “crime” for which
he was not convicted unless his sentence is greater than the maximum available
under the legislature’s generative statutes given the facts proved to the jury at
the trial. The Constitution does not micromanage criminal sentencing, but it
does require that the defendant not be sentenced for a “crime” the government
did not prove he committed. The facts proved by the government as elements
of the offense establish the maximum possible sentence and thus determine the
defendant’s “crime.”

